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Abstract 
Objective:  Dissociation has been suggested as a common experience amongst 
individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), yet this area has received 
limited research beyond demonstrating a relationship exists.  The current study 
sought to generate new knowledge about how and why dissociation might occur 
within the context of OCD.  Inferential Confusion (IC), an OCD specific style of 
reasoning resulting in obsessive doubts, was considered one promising line of 
enquiry.  IC and dissociation both involve elements of engaging with one’s 
imagination.  It was predicted that traits of dissociative absorption and detachment 
would be able to predict the extent to which individuals are susceptible to doubt 
through over investing in possibility-based information, and that this doubt in turn 
would be related to their degree of obsessive-compulsiveness (OC).  Design:  A 
quasi-experimental design was employed to elicit a measure of IC, through the online 
Inference Process Task (IPT).  The IPT is a reasoning task designed to assess 
changes in levels of doubt.  Further cross-sectional data was attained through online 
completion of self-report measures of OC, dissociative traits and depression.  
Participants:  114 non-clinical participants were recruited, 48 were classified as 
experiencing high OC, and 66 as experiencing low OC.  Results:  As expected, a 
positive relationship existed between OC and dissociative traits, with correlations 
ranging from r = .23 to r = .73.  However dissociative traits were not found to predict 
susceptibility to doubt arising from possibility-based information.  Contrary to 
expectation and previous studies, IC was not significantly correlated with OC (r = 
.08).  Conclusion:  It was concluded that dissociative traits had not played a 
significant role in IC.  However, this conclusion should be generalised with caution 
as the results also suggested the IPT may not have reliably operationalised IC.  
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Further replications of the current study would be beneficial, perhaps including an 
alternative measure of IC.   
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Abstract 
Objective:  Dissociation has been suggested as a common experience amongst 
individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), yet this area has received 
limited research beyond demonstrating a relationship exists.  The current study 
sought to generate new knowledge about how and why dissociation might occur 
within the context of OCD.  Inferential Confusion (IC), an OCD specific style of 
reasoning resulting in obsessive doubts, was considered one promising line of 
enquiry.  IC and dissociation both involve elements of engaging with one’s 
imagination.  It was predicted that traits of dissociative absorption and detachment 
would be able to predict the extent to which individuals are susceptible to doubt 
through over investing in possibility-based information, and that this doubt in turn 
would be related to their degree of obsessive-compulsiveness (OC).  Design:  A 
quasi-experimental design was employed to elicit a measure of IC, through the online 
Inference Process Task (IPT).  The IPT is a reasoning task designed to assess 
changes in levels of doubt.  Further cross-sectional data was attained through online 
completion of self-report measures of OC, dissociative traits and depression.  
Participants:  114 non-clinical participants were recruited, 48 were classified as 
experiencing high OC, and 66 as experiencing low OC.  Results:  As expected, a 
positive relationship existed between OC and dissociative traits, with correlations 
ranging from r = .23 to r = .73.  However dissociative traits were not found to predict 
susceptibility to doubt arising from possibility-based information.  Contrary to 
expectation and previous studies, IC was not significantly correlated with OC (r = 
.08).  Conclusion:  It was concluded that dissociative traits had not played a 
significant role in IC.  However, this conclusion should be generalised with caution 
as the results also suggested the IPT may not have reliably operationalised IC.  
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Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterised by the experience of 
obsessions and (or) compulsions.  Obsessions are defined as “recurrent and persistent 
thoughts, urges or images that are experienced as intrusive and unwanted” (The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.; DSM–5; American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, p235).  Compulsions are “repetitive behaviors 
or mental acts that an individual feels driven to perform in response to an obsession 
or according to rules that must be applied rigidly” (APA, 2013, p235).  Although 
rarely mentioned in standard texts, some researchers have suggested that individuals 
with OCD may also frequently experience dissociative symptoms (e.g., Pica, Beere 
& Maurer, 1997). 
 Dissociation is defined by a “disruption and/or discontinuity in the normal 
integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body 
representation, motor control, and behaviour” (APA, 2013, p291).  Whilst 
dissociation is largely represented within established diagnostic manuals as forming 
distinct dissociative disorders (e.g., dissociative amnesia), there is also much 
recognition of a ‘close relationship’ with trauma related disorders (APA, 2013).  The 
propensity for dissociation within the context of OCD however has received 
considerably less acknowledgement or research attention, with most endeavours to 
explore the potential connection resulting in mixed conclusions.  For example,  some 
correlational studies within clinical populations have identified a positive 
relationship between OCD symptom severity and dissociation (Goff, Olin, Jenike, 
Baer & Buttolph, 1992; Prasko et al., 2010), whilst others have found no such 
evidence (Lochner et al., 2004).  Similarly, when comparing individuals with OCD 
to non-clinical control groups a contradictory picture has been obtained, with some 
studies finding those with OCD experiencing significantly higher levels of 
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dissociation (Merckelbach & Wessel, 2000; Raszka, Prasko, Koprivova, Novak & 
Admacova, 2009), whilst other studies have been unable to replicate these findings 
(Prasko et al., 2010; Watson, Wu & Cutshall, 2004).  One possible reason for these 
inconsistent results is the failure to recognise the heterogeneous nature of 
dissociation, for example by disregarding symptom specificity (Watson et al., 2004).  
In summary, over the past two decades, it appears that research into OCD and 
dissociation has remained sporadic, variable in quality, and lacking in explanatory 
value.  As such, the role of dissociation is yet to be conceptually located within an 
OCD framework.  The current paper aims to contribute to the currently sparse 
evidence base around OCD and dissociation. 
 Dissociation has now been recognised across a range of disorders (Spitzer, 
Barnow, Freyberger & Grabe, 2006), yet those experiences which have been labelled 
as dissociative appear to present somewhat differently.  Such observations challenge 
the previously established notion that dissociative symptoms vary only by degree 
along a continuum.  Spitzer et al. (2006) argued that the use of the term dissociation 
had become diffuse and all-encompassing thus creating conceptual confusion, a 
problem which Holmes et al. (2005) believed has hampered consistent and reliable 
research.  Grounded in a review of evidence, the earlier work of Cardeña (1994), 
clinical experience, and also broadly supported by experimental and factor analytic 
studies, Holmes et al. (2005) attempted to clarify the confusion by proposing two 
qualitatively distinct forms of dissociation:  compartmentalisation and detachment.  
Compartmentalisation was said to be characterised by a “deficit in the ability to 
deliberately control processes or actions that would normally be amenable to such 
control” including an “inability to bring normally accessible information into 
conscious awareness” (Holmes et al., 2005, p7).  Importantly, processes which have 
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become compartmentalised (e.g., perceptions and memories), continue to operate but 
their associated information content does not integrate fully with conscious 
experience.  Dissociative amnesia and conversion disorder were said to represent 
forms of compartmentalisation, whilst daydreaming and divided attention both non-
pathological types of compartmentalisation.  The alternative form of dissociation, 
detachment, was defined by Holmes et al. (2005, p5) as “an altered state of 
consciousness characterised by a sense of separation (or a ‘detachment’) from certain 
aspects of everyday experience be it their body (as in out of body experiences), their 
sense of self (as in depersonalisation), or the external world (as in derealisation)”.  
This dichotomous approach to classifying dissociation continues to recognise the 
potential for quantitative variation of symptoms, but on two distinct conceptual 
continuums.  Other researchers (e.g., Brown, 2006; Bowins, 2012) have since 
adopted this approach too.  For a more comprehensive account of detachment and 
compartmentalisation, see Holmes et al. (2005) and Brown (2006). 
Cognitive behavioural theory currently stands at the forefront of OCD 
research and therapy.  Within this approach, obsessions are understood as “normal 
intrusive thoughts, which the sufferer misinterprets as a sign that harm to themselves 
or to others is a serious risk and that they are responsible for such harm (or its 
prevention)” (Salkovskis, 2007, p229).  This approach holds that obsessions 
therefore result from benign ‘intrusions’, and that distress is a product of their 
interpretation.  More recently an alternative (but not necessarily contradictory) 
inference-based approach (IBA) has been proposed by O’Connor and Robillard 
(1995).  The IBA primarily conceptualises obsessions as doubts.  It posits that these 
obsessive doubts are the product of a subjective and dynamic process of reasoning, 
during which an individual with OCD becomes confused between reality and 
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possibility.  Such confusion is said to arise from the interplay between two 
potentially competing sources of information used to make a reasoned judgement 
about a situation:  sense-based information (perceived through the senses) and 
possibility-based information (conceived in the imagination) (Aardema, O’Connor, 
Pélissier & Lavoie, 2009).  Crucially, the IBA predicts that individuals with OCD 
over-invest in possibility-based information at the expense of the more reliable 
source of sense-based information.  This process has been named inferential 
confusion (IC), and reportedly leads an individual to doubt ‘reality’.  When an 
individual is inferentially confused, they infer that remote imaginative possibilities 
are in fact probable and represent reality, and consequently act as if this were so 
regardless of credible sense-based data to the contrary (Aardema & Wu, 2011).  For 
example, “I see the gas stove is switched off, but I believe it might somehow still be 
on”.  Importantly, within the IBA there is no suggestion that perceptual processes are 
actually impaired (Aardema, Emmelkamp & O’Connor, 2005), instead they remain 
intact but must compete against information which has been internally generated.  
The IBA is primarily interested in the IC reasoning style which generates doubt, it is 
regarded as the primary process in OCD.  Subsequent to this, a secondary process 
then takes place whereby the doubts are appraised, e.g.  “if the stove is really still on, 
I will be to blame for a fire”.  This is in contrast to the cognitive model, which 
centralises the importance of the appraisals rather than the obsession itself.   
Empirical support for the IBA has been accrued mainly through questionnaire 
based studies (e.g., Aardema, O’Connor, Emmelkamp, Marchand & Todorov, 2005), 
where individuals with OCD have consistently demonstrated significantly higher 
endorsement of an IC reasoning style.  Further to these, in a novel reasoning task 
(The Inference Process Task, IPT, Aardema et al., 2009) which aimed to emulate the 
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process of weighing up sense-based versus possibility-based information, it was 
found that possibility-based information generated more doubt than reality-based 
information, with those with OCD also being significantly more influenced by 
possibilities than non-clinical controls.  These results imply a differential impact of 
sense-based and possibility-based information in the reasoning processes of people 
with and without OCD.  However, less is understood about why this difference 
exists, and the current paper proposes that the variable of dissociation may play a 
part. 
O’Connor and Aardema (2012) suggest that IC may lead to “immersion in 
possible worlds”, with accompanying feelings of dissociation.  In line with this 
prediction, there appears to be a number of conceptual similarities apparent between 
IC and dissociative phenomena.  For example, reality/sense perception remains intact 
yet is not integrated effectively with other sources of information during the 
reasoning process.  Furthermore, a subset of dissociative symptoms representing 
absorption and imaginative involvement (processes also seemingly implicated in 
shaping possibility-based information in IC) were identified during factor analysis 
(Stockdale, Gridley, Balogh & Holtgraves, 2002) of the commonly used Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES-II, Carlson and Putnam, 1993).  In general Goff et al. (1992) 
and Raszka et al. (2009) found a high incidence of the absorption subtype of 
dissociation in people with OCD.  But more specifically, Aardema and Wu (2011) 
identified that the DES absorption subscale formed a unique and significant 
relationship with IC traits, as measured by Inferential Confusion Questionnaire-
Expanded Version (Aardema et al., 2010).  This final point would benefit from 
further testing using the experimental IPT task (Aardema et al., 2009) which would 
capture the tendency for IC in action.   
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 Bowins (2012) argued that dissociative absorption was positioned within the 
realms of compartmentalisation, defining absorption as “disconnecting from one’s 
circumstances, both external and psychological, and becoming immersed in another 
focus” (p. 309), which may entail a high degree of imaginative involvement.  Brown 
(2006) proposed that compartmentalisation phenomena could be explained by an 
underlying cognitive anomaly residing with the disturbed retrieval of memory.  
Viewing experience as a construction, Brown’s model states that information from 
memory is retrieved in order to help make sense of perceptual information.  
Perceptual hypotheses and primary representations are then created, which form the 
basis for experience.  Experience is therefore importantly not seen as synonymous 
with what is perceived, as it invites the combination of sensory and memory 
information.  The basis for misinterpretation, and therefore an alternative experience 
which does not match reality, was said to be an over-activation of rogue memory 
representations which might originate from internal (e.g., direct experience of the 
symptom, imagery/fantasy) or external experiences (e.g., exposure to symptoms in 
others, media images).  The consequence of retrieving inappropriate rogue memories 
to help interpret perceptual information, is that experience becomes distorted.  
Brown’s (2006) model implies that internally generated information (sourced 
originally either internally or externally) has the potential to dominate sense-based 
data during compartmentalisation.  This explanation appears to fit with the notion of 
IC, where information that has not originated from perceptual sense-based sources 
dominates the content of experience in a very convincing way.  Brown’s (2006) 
model might argue that possibility-based information is so compelling as it originates 
from familiar memory traces. 
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 From a theoretical perspective the central features of IC and 
compartmentalisation appear to converge.  However, O’Connor and Aardema (2012) 
alternatively hypothesised that IC was more aligned with a detachment type 
dissociation, a claim that might tentatively be supported by Watson et al.’s (2004) 
observation that OCD symptoms in general (not specifically related to IC), correlate 
with the ratings of detachment.  With reference to a relational model of 
consciousness, O’Connor and Aardema (2012) hypothesised that conscious 
experience of reality was determined by one’s presence in the current situation, 
meaning the extent to which one’s focus of attention (or project) at that moment in 
time is coherently linked with the perceived context.  However, when one is 
immersed in considering different possibilities about their current situation as is 
thought to be the case in IC, presence (grounding of oneself) is reduced, thus feelings 
of things being somehow distant or unreal are created.  This proposed detachment 
implies a diminished quality of experience, whereas conversely the concept of 
compartmentalisation infers a somehow alternate type of experience that might be 
considered as in some way different, incomplete or distinct from reality.  It is 
important to note however, that to date no empirical evidence has been generated to 
support either hypothesis, and they therefore remain informed speculation.  
Furthermore, both dissociation and OCD are regarded as heterogeneous, and thus the 
possibility for each dissociative subtype to feature in some way in OCD is not 
precluded.   
 In summary, research has indicated the potential for dissociation amongst 
individuals with OCD, however less can currently be explained about its role.  The 
IBA offers one provoking line of enquiry, as it appears there are a number of 
conceptual similarities between dissociation and IC.  The IBA considers obsessions 
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to be doubts which evolve from a dynamic reasoning process of weighing-up sense-
based and possibility-based information.  In a nutshell, IC is a “characteristic of OCD 
that leads the imagination to trump the senses” (Aardema et al., 2005, p343).  
However, a critical question remains unanswered:  why does possibility take on the 
feeling of reality, where genuine perceptions are disbelieved?  The current study 
firstly aimed to employ further replication of the IPT (Aardema et al., 2009), thus 
consolidating ‘in action’ evidence for IC.  Secondly, it proposed to explore whether 
the tendency to dissociate is related to a susceptibility to the impact of possibility-
based (imaginative) information.  It was suggested that the findings of such 
investigation would provide clinically relevant information, as IC and dissociation 
have both been associated with a reduced efficacy of therapeutic interventions for 
OCD (Aardema et al., 2005; Rufer et al. 2006a).  The following predictions were 
made:  (1)  Following from Aardema et al. (2009), possibility-based information will 
increase doubt, whereas conversely reality-based information will reduce doubt.  The 
degree to which possibility-based information induces doubt will be significantly 
greater in those with higher levels of OC, however this difference will only be 
observed in a scenario which infers a typical OC-related concern; (2)  traits of 
dissociative absorption and derealisation will be positively correlated with obsessive-
compulsiveness; (3)  traits of dissociative absorption and derealisation will predict 
variance in the impact of possibility-based information on doubt. 
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Method 
Overview of Design 
 Experimental analysis.  This study used a mixed design quasi-experiment.  
The sample was dichotomised retrospectively on the basis of a self-report measure to 
create two levels of the between-participants variable, ‘level of obsessive 
compulsiveness (OC)’:  (i) those who were high in OC, and (ii) those who were low 
in OC.  In accordance with the established Inference Process Task (IPT, Aardema et 
al., 2009), the within-participants factor was ‘information type’, which consisted of 
two levels:  reality-based and possibility-based information.  The dependent variable 
was the cumulative level of doubt experienced by participants.  This design was 
repeated using the two IPT scenarios designed by Aardema et al. (2009), one which 
inferred risk of harm (OC relevant) and one which was neutral.  This essentially 
created a second within-participants variable, however in this study each scenario 
was analysed separately. 
 Correlation analysis.  Using self-report measures, both dissociative 
absorption and derealisation traits were analysed for evidence of a relationship with 
OC. 
Regression analysis.  The study intended to use a multiple-regression 
technique to establish the unique contribution of self-reported dissociative absorption 
and derealisation traits to the variance of doubt resulting from possibility-based 
information (as measured by the IPT).  The analysis was designed to control for the 
potential effects of depression using a self-report measure of mood.   
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Participants 
OC has been proposed as a continuous variable distributed amongst the general 
population (Rachman and De Silva, 1978; Salkovskis and Harrison, 1984).  In line 
with this and demonstrated by a recent literature review, (Abramowitz et al., 2014) it 
is both common and appropriate to use an analogue sample for OC research.  
Participants were therefore recruited from non-clinical sources where a verifiable 
diagnosis of OCD was neither an inclusion or exclusion criteria.  The sample was 
broad and self-selecting, with the only exclusion factors being a failure to indicate 
one’s consent or being under 18 years old. 
Participants were recruited through placing adverts with local business 
employers and an online OCD charity (see Appendix 1).  The debrief information 
also suggested participants could forward the advert to any interested friends or 
family if they wished, thus ‘snowballing’ the sample.  Participants were included in 
the study if they confirmed they were over 18 years old, able to understand the 
instructions and freely consented.  A priori sample size calculation suggested the 
number of participants recruited provided sufficient power to detect significant 
effects.  The overall sample consisted of 114 participants, of whom 85 (74.6%) were 
female and 29 (25.4%) were male, with a mean age of 35.84 years (range = 18-67, 
SD = 11.04).  The sample mostly consisted of White British individuals (101, 
88.6%), however other ethnic backgrounds were also represented:  White Irish (1, 
.9%), other white backgrounds (10, 8.8%), White-Black African (1, .9%) and 
Chinese (1, .9%).  66 (57.9%) participants had been educated to degree level or 
higher.  In terms of employment 82 (71.6%) were employed full-time, 15 (13.2%) 
employed part-time, 7 (6.1%) were students, 1 (.9%) was retired, 2 (1.8%) were 
unemployed and a further 7 (6.1%) stated their employment status as ‘other’.        
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Although not a prerequisite to participation, 22 individuals identified they had 
sought help for OCD (19.3%).  Other problems for which participants had previously 
sought help included depression (54, 47.4%), social anxiety (13, 11.4%), post-
traumatic stress disorder (8, 7%), panic disorder (9, 7.9%), phobia (6, 5.3%) and 
generalised anxiety disorder (12, 10.5%).  The presence of depressive symptoms in 
the overall sample was measured using the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale – 21 
(DASS21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), where a mean score of 7.09 (SD = 6.68) 
was observed.  This figure would appear higher than in other non-clinical OC sample 
studies (e.g., M = 2.83, SD = 3.87, Henry & Crawford, 2005), and according to 
Lovibond and Lovibond (1995) would be consistent with the ‘moderate range’ of 
depression rather than the ‘normal range’ reported in other non-clinical studies. 
 Where analyses required the demarcation of high and low OC, the sample 
was dichotomised using the recommended cut-score of 18 on the Dimensional 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS, Abramowitz et al., 2010).  The High OC group 
comprised 48 (42.11%) participants, and the Low OC group comprised 66 (57.89%).  
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the high and low OC groups in terms of the 
OC symptom subtypes reported by each.   
 
Table 1   
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations of DOCS Symptom Subscales 
 
Symptom Subscale  High OC Group (n=48)  Low OC Group 
(n=66) 
  M SD  M SD 
Contamination  7.85 5.03  1.44 1.62 
Responsibility  9.23 5.81  1.89 2.13 
Unacceptable thoughts  9.54 5.30  1.64 2.00 
Symmetry  7.83 5.01  1.62 2.12 
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Measures 
 Experimental analogue of reasoning processes.  The Inference Process 
Task (IPT, Aardema et al., 2009) provides an analogue of the reasoning process 
involved in generating obsessional doubt.  The task offers two brief scenarios, each 
followed by three couplets of reality and possibility based information.  Following 
the presentation of each scenario and after each new segment of information, 
participants are asked to rate the probability than an event related to the scenario has 
occurred on a scale of 10-100 (seven ratings in total).  This rating represents the level 
of doubt that the event has not actually occurred.  Participants also rate their baseline 
level of anxiety in response to each scenario.  The first scenario relates to an OCD-
type threat about a potential car accident involving pedestrians, with subsequent 
couplets of information such as “you watch the expressions on people’s faces and see 
no emotion that might indicate an accident” (reality) and “the lack of expression in 
people’s faces may have been shock” (possibility).  The second scenario relates to a 
neutral non-threat condition about a possible bus strike, with following couplets of 
information such as “at the end of the street you see a bus driving on what appears to 
be a different route” (reality), and “maybe the bus was out of service since you could 
not see whether there were any people in it” (possibility).  Minor adaptions were 
made to the original wording of the IPT to suit a British audience for the purposes of 
the current study.  It should also be noted that due to issues with the online 
administration of the IPT, the current investigation did not counterbalance the order 
in which the threat and non-threat conditions were presented, as did the original IPT 
study.  This would therefore potentially allow practice or fatigue effects to emerge on 
the second scenario (neutral condition).  The IPT has demonstrated its ability to 
operationalize inferential confusion by achieving good convergent validity with the 
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Inferential Confusion Questionnaire (Aardema et al., 2005).  See Appendix 2 for full 
IPT task. 
 Self-report measures.  The Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale 
(DOCS, Abramowitz et al., 2010) is a self-report scale consisting of 20 items 
measuring obsessive-compulsiveness.  The severity of obsessions and compulsions 
are measured within four empirically derived dimensions:  contamination, 
responsibility, unacceptable thoughts and symmetry.  Usefully, the DOCS overcomes 
the limitations of other OC measures by accommodating a person’s idiosyncratic 
symptoms.  The severity of OC is rated in relation to a number of domains, including 
disruption to daily life.  The sum of severity scores across all domains yields a total 
severity score (with a maximum possible score of 80).  The author’s evaluation of the 
full scale against another common measure of OC, the Yale Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989), demonstrated good convergent validity (r 
= .54).  Reliability was also confirmed through internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha of .90 for people with an OCD diagnosis; .93 for students) and good test-retest 
coefficients (r = .66).  In the current study the DOCS was found to have excellent 
internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .97.  See appendix 3 for DOCS.   
The Dissociative Experiences Scale II (DES-II, Carlson & Putnam, 1993) is a 
28 item self-report measure of everyday experience, reflecting both pathological and 
non-pathological dissociative traits.  It is minimally amended from the first edition 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES).  Using a scale of 0 to 100, individuals rate the 
frequency with which they experience each dissociative phenomenon.  Frischholz et 
al. (1990) reported the DES had good internal consistency with a full scale 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .95.  A test-retest reliability co-efficient of r = .84 has also been 
reported (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986).  Frischholz et al.  (1990) suggested moderate 
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to good convergent validity through comparing the DES with constructs related to 
dissociation such as perceptual alterations (r = .52) and absorption (r = .39).  The 
foremost purpose of the DES-II’s development was to provide a single quantification 
of dissociation in a clinical population.  Yet a number of researchers have repeatedly 
found an underlying three factor structure, which has also been validated within a 
non-clinical population (Stockdale et al., 2002).  The factors represent i) absorption 
and imaginative involvement, ii) amnesia, iii) derealisation and depersonalisation.  
Whilst these factors are widely used, mixed evidence exists to support them.  The 
scale has also been criticised for assessing frequency instead of severity of symptoms 
(Holmes et al., 2005).  Despite these limitations however, a stronger alternative 
measure is yet to be developed.  In the current study the following Cronbach’s 
alpha’s were calculated:  full scale = .95, absorption and imaginative involvement = 
.92, and derealisation and depersonalisation = .88, indicating good internal 
consistency.  See appendix 4 for DES-II. 
The Dissociative Processes Scale (DPS, Harrison & Watson, 1992) is a 33 
item self-report scale of dissociative tendencies.  Uniquely, the DPS is orientated 
towards detecting differences in the types of dissociation considered normal within 
the general population.  Individuals rate how true each statement is of themselves 
using a five-point likert scale (i.e., strongly disagree, disagree, neutral or cannot 
decide, agree or strongly agree).  Three factor analytically derived subscales have 
been offered:  Obliviousness, Detachment and Imagination.  These appear to broadly 
reflect the commonly used DES-II subscales.  Overall, the DPS correlates with the 
DES-II (rs = .58 and .61, Watson, Wu & Cutshall, 2004), inferring good convergent 
validity.  Investigations by Watson et al. (2004) also revealed good internal 
consistency of the scale (Cronbach’s alpha for the full scale = .94; obliviousness 
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scale = .86; detachment scale = .89; imagination scale = .82).  Notably, the DPS 
remains unpublished and has therefore attracted limited exploration of its 
psychometric properties.  In the current study the DPS achieved good internal 
consistency according to Cronbach’s alpha calculations:  full scale = .95, imagination 
= .89, and detachment = .92.  See appendix 5 for DPS.     
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale 21 (DASS 21; Lovibond and Lovibond, 
1995) is a self-report scale containing 21 items, developed as both a clinical and 
research tool.  Statements regarding emotional states are presented to individuals 
who rate their personal relevance based on a four-point likert scale (i.e., did not apply 
to me at all, applied to me to some degree or some of the time, applied to me to a 
considerable degree or a good part of time, applied to me very much or most of the 
time).  The DASS 21 measures depression, anxiety and stress dimensionally, and 
does not utilise cut-off scores.  Henry and Crawford (2005) reported good internal 
consistency for the scale and it’s subscales (Cronbach’s alpha for the full scale = .93; 
depression scale = .88; anxiety scale = .82; stress scale = .90).  Crawford and Henry 
(2003) found correlation coefficients between the DASS and the Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) which suggested high convergent 
validity (depression scale r = .66; anxiety scale r = .62).  The current study used all 
aspects of the DASS 21 to explore the characteristics of the high and low OC groups, 
however the depression subscale alone was intended to be used during regression 
analysis to control for the potential effect of low mood.  Cronbach’s alphas of .97 for 
the full scale, .96 for the depression subscale, .91 for the anxiety subscale and .91 for 
the stress subscale were found, inferring excellent internal consistency in the current 
study.  See appendix 6 for DASS 21.  
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Apparatus 
The study used an online system by Sawtooth Software Inc. to present and record all 
measures. 
 
Procedure 
The current study was reviewed and granted a favourable ethical opinion by the 
Faculty of Arts & Human Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Surrey 
prior to data collection (see appendix 7 for ethics committee letter).  Participating 
local businesses were approached and placed the recruitment advert on their intranet, 
noticeboard, newsletter or in an email.  Similarly the OCD charity displayed the 
advert on their public website.  Through the advert, participants were directed to the 
secure online testing site.  Initially, written information orientated participants to the 
purpose of the study, the requirements for taking part, their rights and a consent form 
(see appendix 8).  Once informed consent had been indicated, optional demographic 
data was requested (see appendix 9), which was followed by the completion of the 
IPT, DOCS, DES-II, DPS and DASS 21.  Finally, participants were given debrief 
information and the opportunity to contact the researcher should they have questions 
or wish to receive a summary of the findings (see appendix 10).  Throughout the 
study a help page was available to participants which signposted them to sources of 
support should concerns or distress arise (see appendix 11). 
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Results 
The following data was collected online between February and September 2013. 
 
Demarcation of High and Low OC Groups for the Purposes of Analysis 
As already stated, a clinical diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) was 
not sought to differentiate and explore the hypothesised differences between those 
experiencing high and low levels of obsessive-compulsiveness (OC).  Instead, the 
current sample was dichotomised using the recommended cut score of 18 on the 
DOCS.  The low OC group comprised 66 participants with a mean DOCS score of 
6.59 (SD = 4.77), and the high OC group was formed of 48 participants with a mean 
DOCS score of 34.46 (SD = 14.64).   To verify these two groups were indeed 
justifiably distinct and valid, a number of comparisons were made.  This verification 
was important if the subsequent planned analyses were also to be considered valid. 
 From an independent t-test comparison of mean DOCS scores attained in the 
high OC (M = 34.46, SD = 14.64) and low OC (M = 6.59, SD = 4.77) groups, it can 
be inferred that the two groups statistically differ significantly, t(54.32) = -12.70, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-32.26, -23.47].  The magnitude of this difference in means, of -27.87, 
can be considered very large, eta squared = .59.  Furthermore, in Abramowitz et al.’s 
(2010) investigation of the DOCS, a student group attained a mean score of 11.93 
(SD = 9.87), meanwhile those with an OCD diagnosis attained a mean of 30.06 (SD 
= 15.49).  Whilst the current sample used neither specifically students nor those with 
a formal OCD diagnosis, the characteristics of the high and low group might be 
expected to be broadly similar to those in Abramowitz et al.’s (2010) study.  With 
this in mind, the means obtained in the current sample for the dichotomised groups 
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seem sufficiently similar to Abramowitz et al.’s (2010) to support their valid 
distinction.    
 Further confirmation of the sample’s valid division was sought through 
comparing the initial levels of anxiety provoked by reading each scenario presented 
by the IPT.  Logic would predict that those with a higher level of OC would report 
higher levels of anxiety than those with low OC.  Analysis demonstrated that this 
distinction was apparent.  Due to non-normal distributions of data in both OC groups, 
a Mann-Whitney U test was used for comparison of anxiety in the threat related 
(driving) scenario.  This showed those with high OC (Md  = 100, n = 48), were 
significantly more anxious at the start of the task than those with low OC (Md = 90, n 
= 66), U = 1027.50, z = -3.38, p = .001.  The effect size of this difference was 
medium, r = .32.  Using an independent t-test (as the assumption of normality was 
met for both OC groups), a difference in initial anxiety levels was similarly found in 
the non-threat related scenario between those in the high OC (M = 51, SD = 31.11) 
and low OC groups (M = 32.42, SD = 20.61), t(76.18) = -3.60, p = .001, 95% CI [-
28.85, -8.30].  The effect size of this difference was moderate to large, eta squared = 
.10. 
 In a final test of the different characteristics held by the low and high OC 
groups, the levels of depression, anxiety and stress reported by each group through 
the DASS were compared.  Depression, anxiety and stress are common co-morbid 
symptom of OCD, and therefore a true high OC group could also be expected to 
demonstrate a higher level of such symptoms than their low OC counterparts.  These 
expected contrasts were indeed present within the current sample.  A Mann-Whitney 
U test (performed on the basis of non-normal distribution of scores) showed that 
those with high OC (Md = 10, n = 48) also had significantly higher levels of 
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depressive symptoms than those with low OC (Md = 2.5, n = 66), U = 570.50, z = -
5.84, p < .001).  The degree of difference was considered large, r = .55.  Comparison 
of the anxiety subscale for the high and low OC group also revealed a significant 
difference, where a Mann-Whitney U test (performed on the basis of a non-normal 
distribution of scores), demonstrated that those in the high OC group (Md = 7, n = 
48) experienced significantly higher levels of anxiety that those in the low OC group 
(Md = 1, n = 66), U = 466, z = -6.47, p < .001).  This was considered a large 
difference, r = 0.61.  Finally, an independent t-test showed that the high OC group 
(M = 12.98, SD = 5.27) reported significantly more stress than the low OC group (M 
= 5.55, SD = 4.27), t(88.07) = -8.04, p < .001, 95% CI [-9.27, -5.60].  The magnitude 
of this difference in means, of -7.43, would be considered large, eta squared = 0.36. 
Together these analyses indicate that the high and low OC groups created for 
the current sample are substantially different enough in a number of key features to 
be considered valid representations. 
 
Hypothesis One:  The Impact of Possibility and Reality-Based Information on 
People with High Levels of OC 
In line with Aardema et al.’s (2009) IPT study, levels of doubt were measured by 
calculating the impact of possibility-based and reality-based information on how 
likely a person judged an event to have occurred within a given scenario.  Higher 
probability scores represent higher levels of doubt (i.e., doubt that the event did not 
really occur).  Doubt arising from possibility-based information was calculated by 
subtracting probability ratings following reality-based information from the ratings 
following their paired possibility-based information.  This was done for each pairing 
of new information, giving a total of three scores that were totalled to form the 
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cumulative impact of possibility score.  Similarly, the cumulative impact of reality 
score was calculated by subtracting ratings following possibility-based information 
from their preceding rating (i.e., initial rating or prior possibility rating), then 
totalling the resulting scores.   See Figure 1 for scoring illustration.     
 
 Cumulative Impact 
of Possibility =  
Cumulative Impact 
of Reality =  
 Initial probability rating 
(I) 
 
 
 
(R1 - I) 
 Probability rating 
following reality 
information (R1) 
 
(P1 – R1) 
 Probability rating 
following possibility 
rating (P1) 
 
(R2 - P1) 
 Probability rating 
following reality 
information (R2) 
 
(P2 - R2) 
 Probability rating 
following possibility 
rating (P2) 
 
(R3 - P2) 
 Probability rating 
following reality 
information (R3) 
 
(P3 - R3) 
 Probability rating 
following possibility 
rating (P3) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Calculation of Cumulative Doubt Scores from the IPT. 
 
A mixed 2 (level of OC) x 2 (type of information) ANOVA was performed to 
investigate how possibility and reality-based information impact levels of doubt, and 
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whether this impact is differentiated by a person’s level of OC.  This analysis was 
repeated for both the threat-related and neutral condition.  See appendix 12 for data 
distributions and justification of analytic strategy.  In the threat-related condition, no 
interaction was found between the impact of different types of information and level 
of OC on self-ratings of doubt, Wilks’ Lambda = 1.00, F(1, 112) = .08, p = .78, 
partial eta squared = .001.  This implies that doubt as a result of either possibility or 
reality-based information is not significantly influenced by the level of OC a person 
experiences.  A significant main effect was detected for the impact of information 
type on doubt (possibility or reality), Wilks’ Lambda = .50, F(1,112) = 112.59, p = 
.001, partial eta squared = .50, with both high and low OC groups showing an 
increase of doubt following possibility based information (increase denoted by 
positive figure) and a decrease in doubt following reality based information (denoted 
by a negative figure) (see Table 2).  The main effect comparing low and high OC 
groups was not significant, F(1,112) = 2.41 , p = .12, partial eta squared = .02, which 
suggests no substantial difference in doubt between those with varying levels of OC.  
See Table 2 for the mean cumulative doubt scores for each OC group following 
possibility and reality-based information.   
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Table 2   
Cumulative Doubt Scores for Low and High OC Groups Following Possibility- and 
Reality-Based Information (Threat Scenario Condition of the IPT).  
 
Information 
Type 
 Low OC  High OC 
  n M SD  n M SD 
Reality-
based 
 
 66 -66.73 52.35  48 -65.33 56.87 
Possibility-
based 
 66 29.67 45.00  48 36.35 51.09 
 
A similar pattern of results was also found in the neutral scenario condition of 
the IPT (see Table 3 for the mean cumulative doubt scores for each OC group 
following possibility and reality-based information).  Again no interaction effect was 
detected between the impact of different types of information and level of OC on 
self-ratings of doubt, Wilks’ Lambda = 1.00, F(1,112) = .38, p = .54, partial eta 
square = .003.  This indicates that an individual’s level of OC does not influence how 
they respond to different types of information.  In the neutral scenario a significant 
main effect was also found for the impact of information type on doubt (possibility 
or reality), Wilks’ Lambda = .39 , F(1,112) = 173.39, p <.001, partial eta squared = 
.61, where both high and low OC groups displayed an increase of doubt following 
possibility based information (increase by denoted positive figure) and a decrease in 
doubt following reality based information (denoted by a negative figure) (see Table 
3).  The main effect comparing low and high OC groups doubt scores was not 
significant, F(1,112) = 1.95, p = .17, partial eta squared = .02.  It therefore appears 
that doubt, as measured by the IPT, does not vary significantly between those with 
different degrees of OC. 
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Table 3 
Cumulative Doubt Scores for Low and High OC Groups Following Possibility- and 
Reality-Based Information (Neutral Scenario Condition of the IPT) 
 
Information 
Type 
 Low OC  High OC 
  n M SD  n M SD 
Reality-
based 
 
 66 -58.45 36.73  48 -59.63 44.05 
Possibility-
based 
 66 26.11 26.62  48 33.23 42.76 
 
In light of there appearing to be no appreciable difference between how 
people who are either high or low in OC respond to different types of information, a 
further correlational test was performed to explore this through an alternative 
approach to analysis.  Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient revealed that 
in the threat condition no significant relationship existed between OC (as measured 
by the DOCS total score) and levels of doubt in response to possibility-based 
information, r = .08, n = 114, p = .38.  This adds support to the findings of the 
previous ANOVAs, that the extent of a person’s OC is not related to the level of 
doubt they will experience as a result of receiving possibility-based information. 
Further to the main analyses, an interesting observation was made that 
although cumulative doubt ratings did not differ between those high and low in OC, 
the two groups did in fact show significantly different initial probability ratings.  In 
the threat condition a Mann-Whitney U test (used on the basis of non-normal 
distributions) showed that the initial probability ratings of people low in OC (Md = 
80, n =66 ) differed significantly from those of people high in OC (Md = 90, n = 48), 
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U = 1222.50, z = -2.10, p = .04, with a small to medium effect size, r = .2.  This 
result however was not specific to the threat related condition, as in the neutral 
scenario condition individuals who were high in OC (Md = 80, n = 48) also reported 
significantly more probability of an event occurring than those low in OC (Md = 70, 
n = 66), U = 1224.00, z = -2.09, p = .04, which amounted to a small to medium effect 
size, r = .2..  It would therefore seem that people high in OC initially perceived 
events more likely to happen than those low in OC, however this was evident in both 
threat and non-threat scenarios. 
 In summary, these results suggest that the type of information presented 
about a scenario is an important factor in determining how much doubt is 
experienced about the situation, the effect size for the impact of such information 
was very large for both threat-based and neutral scenarios.  However an individual’s 
level of OC was not a significant influence in how people respond to this 
information, and the doubt of individuals who are high in OC does not increase more 
as a result of possibility information than those with low OC as predicted.  These 
patterns of response remained consistent across both threat and neutral scenarios.   
 
Hypothesis Two:  The Relationship Between OC and Dissociative Absorption 
and Derealisation 
A Spearman’s rho test was calculated to assess the relationship between OC (as 
measured by the DOCS total score) and two subscales of the DES-II:  the 
imaginative involvement and absorption subscale, and the derealisation and 
depersonalisation subscale.  This non-parametric test was used due to the non-normal 
distribution of variables in the full sample (see appendix 12).  This analysis was also 
repeated for the two conceptually equivalent subscales of the DPS:  imagination and 
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detachment.  See Table 4 for results.  All correlations were statistically significant 
and of a positive direction.  Furthermore all correlations, apart from that of the 
DOCS and DPS imagination subscale, achieved a large effect size.  Whilst still a 
significant correlation, the relationship between the DOCS and DPS imagination 
subscale achieved only a small effect size.  
 
Table 4   
Spearman’s Rho Results for Relationships Between OC and Dissociation in the Full 
Sample (n = 114) 
 
DOCS 
Score 
DES-II 
Imaginative 
involvement and 
absorption 
DES-II 
Derealisation and 
depersonalisation 
DPS 
Imagination 
DPS 
Detachment 
DOCS 
total 
.68 (p <.001) .73 (p <.001) .23 (p = .01) .62(p <.001) 
 
 Though the DES-II is the most commonly used measure of dissociative traits 
in research, it has also been subject to a number of criticisms.  Therefore the DPS, an 
alternative and little used measure of dissociation designed specifically for a non-
clinical population, was used alongside the DES-II in the current study.  To explore 
the validity of the DPS as a future research tool, the total and individual subscales 
were correlated with those of the DES-II using a Spearman’s rho test.  A strong 
positive correlation was found between the full scale scores of the dissociation 
measures, r = .77, n = 114, p <.001.  Next the broadly corresponding subscales were 
correlated.  Firstly, a significant positive relationship was found between the DES-II 
amnesia and DPS obliviousness subscales, r = .63, n = 114, p <.001.  The association 
between the DES-II imaginative involvement and absorption subscale and the DPS 
Kerry Morrison                                                                                                            Page 33 of 179 
 
imagination subscale was also both positive and significant, r = .49, n = 114, p 
<.001.  Finally, the DES-II derealisation and depersonalisation subscale and the DPS 
detachment subscale also showed a significant positive relationship, r = .80, n = 114, 
p <.001.  This set of relationships supports the validity of the DPS as an alternative 
research measure of dissociation. 
 
Hypothesis three:  Dissociation as a Potential Predictor of Doubt Resulting from 
Possibility-Based Information 
Prior to a hierarchal multiple regression analysis, preliminary correlational tests were 
carried out to confirm whether a relationship existed between subtypes of 
dissociative traits and the level of doubt arising from possibility-based information.  
Previous research (Aardema et al., 2009) has suggested that IC is specifically only 
present in domains where there are OC related concerns, rather than being a 
pervasive reasoning style, for this reason the analysis was carried out only for the 
IPT threat-based scenario.  Due to some of the variables violating assumptions of 
normality, non-parametric tests were used (see appendix 12).  A series of Spearman’s 
rho tests performed on the full sample (n = 114) showed that no significant 
relationship existed between the cumulative impact of possibility-based information 
(doubt) and the subscales of interest on the DES-II:  the imaginative involvement and 
absorption subscale, and the derealisation and depersonalisation subscale.  Likewise, 
the DPS imagination and detachment subscales also demonstrated statistically non-
significant relationships with the cumulative impact of possibility based information. 
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Table 5   
Spearman’s Rho Results for Relationships Between Dissociation and Doubt 
Following Possibility-based Information in the Threat Scenario (Full Sample, n = 
114) 
 
Doubt DES-II 
Imaginative 
involvement and 
absorption 
DES-II 
Derealisation and 
depersonalisation 
DPS 
Imagination 
DPS 
Detachment 
Cumulative 
doubt 
following 
possibility-
based 
information 
.11 (p = .25) .08 (p = .39) .12 (p = .22) .09 (p = .35) 
 
As these correlational tests failed to show any significant relationships, it was 
considered unproductive to proceed with the planned regression analysis.  From the 
lack of basic correlations, it can be concluded that neither type of dissociative trait is 
significantly related to the level of doubt experienced by an individual as a result of 
receiving possibility-based information, and they would therefore also lack 
predictive power. 
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Discussion 
The foremost purpose of the current study was to derive new explanatory knowledge 
relating to the frequently observed convergence of obsessive-compulsiveness (OC) 
and dissociation, contributing to what is currently a relatively sparse body of 
literature.  In line with past research, a significant relationship was found to exist in 
the current data between OC and dissociative traits, specifically experiences 
representing the imaginative absorption and derealisation/detachment elements of 
dissociation.  In an attempt to identify a theoretical basis for such a relationship, it 
was hypothesised that the tendency of those with OC to dissociate, particularly where 
an imaginative element was present, might be connected with the obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) based idea of inferential confusion (IC).  A fundamental 
feature of people who are inferentially confused is that when making judgements 
about a situation, they tend to be more susceptible to the influence of information 
that is internally generated and based on what one might imagine could possibly 
happen (as opposed to information received from the senses which describes what is 
actually happening), thus resulting in doubt.  Given the imaginative component 
necessary for IC (i.e., to create possibility-based information) it was predicted that 
the tendency to dissociate would predict an individual’s susceptibility to possibility-
based information.  This hypothesis however was not substantiated.  Interestingly, 
not only could a significant relationship not be found between the traits of 
dissociative absorption and susceptibility to possibility-based information, the 
outcomes of the Inference Process Task (IPT, Aardema et al., 2009) in general were 
not consistent with previous comparisons of OC versus non-OC groups.  These 
findings will be explored in terms of theory and methodology, and the limitations of 
this study also discussed. 
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 Past research has demonstrated that people with OCD are significantly more 
likely to experience dissociation than non-clinical groups (Merckelbach & Wessel, 
2000; Raszka et al., 2009), and furthermore a positive correlation exists between the 
degree of OC and dissociation (Goff et al., 1992; Prasko et al. (2010).  The 
replicability of these findings was tested.  As predicted, a positive association 
between OC and dissociative traits could be observed, where those who reported 
being more affected by OC also reported a higher number of dissociative absorption 
and derealisation/detachment experiences.  This is a useful finding in two respects; 
firstly it contributes further support to the body of evidence suggesting OC and 
dissociation are related.  Secondly, it endorses the use of a non-clinical sample in 
similar research as the relationship could be demonstrated even in those who might 
be considered as experiencing a ‘low dose’ of symptoms.  As with all correlational 
research however, the same limitations arise in that a relationship can be highlighted, 
but no inferences of causality can be drawn. Unfortunately, this is the point at which 
the majority of existing research has ceased, rarely going further to offer and explore 
a theoretical explanation for the relationship.  Therefore the current study sought to 
develop this gap in knowledge and practice.  
Drawing on Brown’s (2006) work concerning the possible cognitive 
processes underlying compartmentalisation, a potential connection between 
dissociation and OC was proposed.  Theoretically, both dissociative absorption and 
IC embrace an element of compelling imagination.  In Brown’s (2006) model a 
compartmentalised dissociative experience might occur when internal information 
(e.g. generated imaginatively), is inappropriately retrieved and overrepresented in the 
process of interpreting external situational information, thus creating an alternative 
and distorted experience.  The current study drew a parallel between this type of 
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dissociative compartmentalised experience and IC, where information perceived by 
the senses is essentially trumped by what the mind imagines might be possible 
(Aardema et al., 2005).  It was hypothesised that the tendency to experience the 
absorption subtype of dissociative symptoms would be predictive of an individual’s 
tendency to also become inferentially confused.  This hypothesis and its rationale 
however was not supported by the current data, as the degree of dissociative 
absorption traits reported by participants could not predict the extent to which they 
were also influenced by possibility-based information.  This is surprising as Aardema 
and Wu (2011) found that IC, as measured by a self-report questionnaire, was 
significantly correlated with the DES-absorption subscale, yet the IPT, an 
experimental analogue designed to operationally measure the same concept, was 
unable to demonstrate the same relationship. O’Connor and Aardema (2012) 
proposed an alternative dissociation-IC link, claiming that it was the experience of 
becoming detached from one’s surroundings that was more likely to be associated 
with IC.  However, the current study did not support this either, as trait 
derealisation/detachment measures also showed no significant relationship with IC.   
One conclusion to draw from the failed attempt to predict susceptibility to 
doubt from dissociative traits is that no genuine link exists between the two 
phenomena.  This does not necessarily dispute that dissociation and OC are related in 
some way, however the current data suggests that they might not converge through 
IC.  Although, by deconstructing the findings, alternative explanations for the non-
significant relationship can be offered. 
It is possible that imperfections in the measurement of both IC and 
dissociation may have inadvertently influenced the ability to detect a significant 
predictive relationship.  The IPT (Aardema et al., 2009) is designed to imitate IC in 
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action, thus providing information about the reasoning process ‘in the moment’.  
However, whilst dissociation tends to be a transient state (Kruger & Mace, 2002) 
both the DES-II (Carlson & Putnam, 1993) and the DPS (Harrison & Watson, 1992) 
essentially report on an individual’s general trait towards dissociative experiences.  
Therefore neither measure of dissociation was able to determine whether a 
participant was actually dissociated at the point of reasoning within the IPT.  In this 
respect, even if a significant result had been found, it would still be questionable to 
infer that dissociation had influenced a participant’s reasoning process ‘in the 
moment’.  A more appropriate approach to investigating the hypothesis would have 
been to use a state measure of dissociation, however these are in short supply 
compared to trait measures.  Further issues with the measurement of dissociation 
come from difficulties with the scales’ psychometric properties.  In line with 
previous OCD and dissociation research (for example, Rufer, Fricke, Held, Cremer, 
& Hand, I., 2006b) and contemporary thinking on dissociation (Holmes et al., 2005), 
the current study adopted a symptom subtype approach to dissociation.  The  
commonly used three factor model of the DES-II was therefore employed to reflect 
symptom subtypes through subscales.  However, the validity of such subscales is 
debatable as factor analytic studies have revealed a number of variations in their 
structure (Carlson & Putnam, 1993).  As such, the DES-II’s original authors (who 
intended it to yield a unitary score) advise caution in using the resulting subscales.  
Further to this point, more recent theory has developed around the nature and 
occurrence of dissociation (e.g. most notably Holmes et al., 2005), yet the most 
commonly used instruments to measure dissociation have not evolved to reflect these 
developments.  It might be argued nevertheless, that despite these issues encountered 
in the measurement of dissociation, the fact remains that the DES-II in particular has 
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been adequate both in previous and the current research to detect a relationship 
between OC and dissociation.  However, the characteristics of the absorption 
subscale are particularly pertinent to the current study, and may propose a more 
unique problem.  The absorption subscale of the DES-II represents absorption in both 
internal (imaginative) and external events.  Therefore it is unable to inform us 
whether an individual has a specific tendency to be drawn into imaginative 
experiences, which are more pertinent to the investigation of IC, or is more inclined 
to become absorbed into external activities such as watching a film.  It is therefore 
possible that the DES-II absorption subscale was not a reliable representation of a 
person’s tendency towards imaginative involvement.  Through the addition of the 
DPS though, it could be contended that this was not a significant factor, particularly 
as the DPS predominantly measures imaginative absorption and generated similar 
results to that of the DES-II.   
The finding that neither type of dissociative trait investigated formed a 
significant relationship with the impact of possibility-based information on doubt 
was unexpected.  But a further oddity in the data may also help to explain this.  The 
current study essentially sought to provide a replication of the original IPT task in 
order to evaluate its reliability as a research tool.  On the basis of Aardema et al.’s  
(2009) IPT study it was hypothesised that doubt would be increased by possibility-
based information and decreased by reality-based information, with the predicted rise 
in doubt being more exaggerated in those with high levels of OC.  However, the 
current data could not confirm this hypothesis and therefore the results of the original 
and only other existing IPT study could not be replicated.  The results demonstrated 
that possibility and reality based information impacted doubt as expected (i.e., 
possibility information increased doubt and reality information decreased it), but the 
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extent of this impact was not differentiated for the high and low OC groups.  Such 
differentiation (i.e., doubt would be aroused to a greater extent by possibility 
information for people who were high in OC) is a central tenet of the IC paradigm.  It 
is perhaps therefore unsurprising that the expected relationship between dissociation 
and impact of possibility-based information could not be found. 
In light of being unable to replicate the original IPT results it could be 
suggested that either IC does not exist as a valid concept, or that the IPT is an 
unreliable analogue of IC and does not consistently measure what it claims to.  There 
is however insufficient evidence to reject IC as a whole, particularly as other 
questionnaire based studies support the overall concept (Aardema et al., 2010).  In 
regard to the IPT task, although it is entirely possible that it is unable to measure IC, 
it is difficult to draw authorative conclusions about this experimental method as there 
are no other published replication attempts to corroborate either position on its 
effectiveness.  Aardema et al. (2009) found the Inferential Confusion Questionnaire – 
Expanded Version (ICQ-EV) a significant predictor of doubt in the IPT (beta = 0.41, 
p < 0.05).  Including the ICQ-EV in the current study may therefore have been 
helpful to correlate with the IPT results, to reveal whether the IPT was indeed 
operating in the same way in this sample.  However, adding another questionnaire to 
an already extensive set of measures may have made participation onerous and off-
putting for participants. 
Indeed, more investigations of the IPT in the future would be helpful.  A 
further possible explanation for the inconsistencies between Aardema et al. (2009) 
and the current findings relates to the potential for a fundamental difference in the 
samples used by both studies, thus generating different results.  When dichotomising 
the current sample into high and low OC groups, checks were employed to ensure 
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that this distinction was valid and characteristics consistent with what might be 
expected from a clinical OCD group versus a non-OCD group.  A significant 
difference between the high and low groups in self-reported OC symptoms, anxiety 
evoked during the IPT threat-based scenario and levels of self-reported depression all 
supported the assertion that the high OC group was sufficiently different from the 
low OC group, in terms of features that you would expect to differentiate an OCD 
group from a non-OCD group.  However it remains possible that the samples still 
differed markedly from one another thus prompting a difference in outcomes.  
Aardema et al. (2009) reported that all major domains of obsessive thoughts and 
compulsions were represented in their sample, although it appeared that their most 
endorsed symptom sub-domains in their OCD group related to mental control and 
perfection/certainty.  In the current study the most commonly reported symptom 
domains in the high OC group related to unacceptable thoughts and responsibility.  
Each study used a different instrument to evaluate OC and therefore direct 
comparability of the representation of symptoms within the samples is problematic.  
But given that OCD is a highly heterogeneous condition, if there were fundamental 
differences in symptom representation, it would be unwise to assume that each 
sample would display identical IC behaviours.  Indeed, other research (Grabe et al., 
1999; Rufer et al., 2006b; Watson et al., 2004) has revealed that the experience of 
dissociation could be most strongly linked with individuals who reported more 
symptoms in the checking domain, thus indicating that the predominant type of OCD 
may impact significantly on related phenomena.  The potential for differences in the 
core OC characteristics between the current and original IPT sample may go some 
way towards explaining their notably different performances on the IPT task.  Future 
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replication attempts would be wise to use identical measures of OC in order to 
reduce the ambiguity. 
Finally, in line with the IBA it was predicted that an IC style of reasoning 
would be present only in the IPT scenario which incorporated an OCD related 
concern.  However, due to issues with the online administration of the IPT, the threat 
and non-threat based scenarios were not presented in a counterbalanced fashion, thus 
introducing the potential for practice or fatigue effects to emerge on the non-threat 
based scenario.  It is therefore difficult to draw firm conclusions over the participants 
tendency to use similar reasoning styles between the two scenarios. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary this study has been able to add further support to the body of evidence 
suggesting that OCD and dissociative traits are connected.  Little research is 
currently available to explain why this link exists.  Drawing on related literature, the 
current study hypothesised that dissociation may play a role in IC, a problematic 
reasoning style associated with OCD that is proposed to result in obsessive doubts.  
However, traits of dissociation could not predict susceptibility to doubt as expected 
thus perhaps suggesting the dissociation-OCD link does not exist through IC.  
Alternatively, it was proposed that this non-significant finding may have been 
attributable to weaknesses in the measurement of the variables in question rather than 
a genuine lack of relationship, particularly as the IPT did not yield the results that 
would be expected of an OCD sample in general.  The area of dissociation and IC 
therefore remains a subject of interest that may benefit from further investigation. 
 Further exploration of if and how dissociation is implicated in IC would 
profit from more ‘in-action’ experiments.  This would however require more 
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certainty around the reliability of the IPT or alternative methods to measure IC as it 
happens.  Robust experimental design would also benefit from the ability to induce 
dissociation whilst individuals participate in an IC orientated task, to be certain that a 
dissociative state is at play at that moment.  Aside from the ethical issues involved in 
this however, there are a number of methodological complications relating to how to 
induce and maintain dissociation adequately throughout a task.  Leonard, Telch and 
Harrington (1999) asserted that research into dissociative problems has lagged 
behind that of anxiety and depression, and that the development of experimental 
provocations of dissociation would help to accelerate research in this area.   
Given the numerous heterogeneous presentations of OCD and dissociation, it 
is reasonable to surmise that the two may interplay in a number of different ways, 
through IC being just one possibility.  As the area of dissociation and OCD is 
relatively under investigated, even non-significant results might be viewed as useful 
as they serve to exclude and narrow down possibilities in a widely unexplained area.  
It is important for research to continue to pursue an empirically-based and 
theoretically sound explanation of the dissociation-OCD relationship.  Clinicians 
frequently report dissociation as a significant feature in their clients with OCD, yet 
there is no guidance on how to formulate and address these difficulties.  Related to 
this, it has also been reported that individuals with higher levels of dissociation do 
less well in their therapy for OCD (Rufer et al., 2006a).  Thus further research is both 
justified and desirable. 
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Appendix 1 (MRP) 
Recruitment Adverts 
 (i)  placed with an online OCD charity 
 (ii) placed with employers 
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Can you help with some research? 
 
Dissociation and OCD – Does dissociation play a role in forming obsessions and 
doubts? 
 
My name is Kerry Morrison and I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist studying at the 
University of Surrey.  I would like to ask for your help with a piece of research I am 
carrying out.  This research is about people with obsessions and compulsions and 
their experience of dissociation (dissociation is when the mind performs lots of tasks 
but does not join all this information together). 
 
This is an online task and will take approximately 30 minutes.  It involves reading 
two scenarios and making some decisions about them.  There will also be 4 
questionnaires to complete.  The task is carried out via a secure online system and 
your answers will be anonymous. 
 
This study has been given a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Arts and 
Human Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Surrey. 
 
You can take part if: 
 You are over 18 years old  
 Your main problem is obsessions and/or compulsions 
 You can spare 30 minutes to take part 
 
Please follow the link below to find out more and to get started. 
 
http://surveys.fahs.surrey.ac.uk/obsessive-compulsiveness_and_dissociation 
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Can you help with some research into OCD  
(obsessive-compulsive disorder)? 
 
Dissociation and OCD – Does dissociation play a role in forming obsessions and 
doubts? 
 
My name is Kerry Morrison and I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist studying at the 
University of Surrey.  I would like to ask for your help with a piece of research I am 
carrying out. This research is about people with obsessions and compulsions and 
their experience of dissociation (dissociation is when the mind performs lots of tasks 
but does not join all this information together). 
 
I am asking both people with and without OCD to take part. This is because it is 
helpful to understand how both groups of people might be similar and different. 
This is an online task and will take approximately 30 minutes. It involves reading 
two scenarios and making some decisions about them. There will also be 4 
questionnaires to complete.  The task is carried out via a secure online system and 
your answers will be anonymous. 
 
You can take part if: 
 You are over 18 years old  
 You can spare 30 minutes to take part 
 
Please follow the link below to find out more and to get started. 
 
http://surveys.fahs.surrey.ac.uk/obsessive-compulsiveness_and_dissociation 
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Appendix 2 (MRP) 
 
Inference Process Task (Aardema et al., 2009) 
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You will now be presented with two scenarios and you will be asked to rate the 
probability of the event occurring in each scenario. Six new pieces of information 
will then be shown after each scenario and you will be asked to rate the probability 
of the event occurring in response to this new information. 
 
 
Scenario A 
Please imagine you are in this situation 
 
You are driving to work in your car. Before you left home you were listening to the 
local news on the radio. The reporter was describing an accident where a van driver 
unknowingly drove over someone, and left the scene of the accident without 
realising. You wonder how it is possible that someone could not notice this while 
driving. As you drive along, you come to a pedestrian crossing that is controlled by 
traffic lights. The light is red so you stop and wait. This particular junction is quite 
busy, with a lot of people on the pavement waiting to cross the road. You notice a 
group of schoolchildren, boys and girls, chasing each other, running on and off the 
pavement. As the light turns green you start to accelerate. Then, just as you pass 
through the traffic lights you hear a scream and feel a bump. 
 
How anxious would you feel in the above situation? Please enter a number in the box 
between 0 and 100 where 0 is 'not anxious at all' and 100 is 'the most anxious I could 
feel'. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that an accident has happened under these 
circumstances? Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
'improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
You will now be presented with six pieces of new information and you will be asked 
to rate 
the probability of the event occurring in response to this new information. 
 
You look in the rear-view mirror and see a pothole in the road. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that an accident has happened under these 
circumstances? Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
The pothole may not have been deep enough to cause the bump. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that an accident has happened under these 
circumstances? Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
You turn your head and see no one lying on the street. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that an accident has happened under these 
circumstances? Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
Kerry Morrison                                                                                                            Page 60 of 179 
 
 
You may not have seen everything, because it’s quite crowded. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that an accident has happened under these 
circumstances? Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
You watch the expressions on people’s faces and see no emotion that might indicate 
an 
accident. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that an accident has happened under these 
circumstances? Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
The lack of expression in people’s faces may have been shock. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that an accident has happened under these 
circumstances? Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
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Scenario B 
Please imagine you are in this situation 
 
You are on your way to a restaurant for an evening out with your friends. You have 
decided to take the bus to save some money even though the possibility of a bus 
strike was announced on the news yesterday. Once you arrive at the bus stop you 
wait for 20 minutes with several people standing beside you and still no bus has 
arrived. Then you overhear something about “a strike”.  Soon afterwards most of the 
people around you disappear.   
 
How anxious would you feel in the above situation? Please enter a number in the box 
between 0 and 100 where 0 is 'not anxious at all' and 100 is 'the most anxious I could 
feel’.   
 
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances?  Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
'improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
You will now be presented with six pieces of new information and you will be asked 
to rate 
the probability of the event occurring in response to this new information. 
 
At the end of the street you see a bus driving on what appears to be a different route. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances?  Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
'improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
Maybe the bus was out of service since you could not see whether there were any 
people in 
it. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances?  Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
'improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
A person tells you he took the bus earlier in the day. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances?  Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
'improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
The strike may have only started later in the day. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances?  Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
'improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
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You call the information service and get an automated message with no mention of 
any 
strike. 
 
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances?  Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 
'improbable' and 100 is 'certain'. 
 
Maybe the bus company doesn’t give out this type of information that quickly. 
What do you consider to be the probability that there is a bus strike under these 
circumstances? 
 
Please enter a number in the box between 10 and 100 where 10 is 'improbable' and 
100 is 'certain'. 
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Appendix 3 (MRP) 
 
Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Abramowitz et al., 2010) 
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This questionnaire asks you about 4 different types of concerns that you might or 
might not experience. For each type there is a description of the kinds of thoughts 
(sometimes called obsessions) and behaviors (sometimes called rituals or 
compulsions) that are typical of that particular concern, followed by 5 questions 
about your experiences with these thoughts and behaviors. Please read each 
description carefully and answer the questions for each category 
based on your experiences in the last month. 
 
Category 1: Concerns about Germs and Contamination 
Examples . . . 
-Thoughts or feelings that you are contaminated because you came into contact with 
(or were nearby) a certain object or person. 
-The feeling of being contaminated because you were in a certain place (such as a 
bathroom). 
-Thoughts about germs, sickness, or the possibility of spreading contamination. 
-Washing your hands, using hand sanitizer gels, showering, changing your clothes, or 
leaning objects because of concerns about contamination. 
-Following a certain routine (e.g., in the bathroom, getting dressed) because of 
contamination 
-Avoiding certain people, objects, or places because of contamination. 
 
The next questions ask about your experiences with thoughts and behaviors related to 
contamination over the last month.  Keep in mind that your experiences might be 
different than the examples listed above. Please circle the number next to your 
answer: 
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1. About how much time have you spent each day thinking about contamination and 
engaging in washing or cleaning behaviors because of contamination? 
 
0 None at all 
1 Less than 1 hour each day 
2 Between 1 and 3 hours each day 
3 Between 3 and 8 hours each day 
4 8 hours or more each day 
 
2. To what extent have you avoided situations in order to prevent concerns with 
contamination or having to spend time washing, cleaning, or showering? 
 
0 None at all 
1 A little avoidance 
2 A moderate amount of avoidance 
3 A great deal of avoidance 
4 Extreme avoidance of nearly all things 
 
3. If you had thoughts about contamination but could not wash, clean, or shower (or 
otherwise remove the contamination), how distressed or anxious did you become? 
 
0 Not at all distressed/anxious 
1 Mildly distressed/anxious 
2 Moderately distressed/anxious 
3 Severely distressed/anxious 
4 Extremely distressed/anxious 
 
4. To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been 
disrupted by contamination concerns and excessive washing, showering, cleaning, or 
avoidance behaviors? 
 
0 No disruption at all. 
1 A little disruption, but I mostly function well. 
2 Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage. 
3 My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing. 
4 My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all. 
 
5. How difficult is it for you to disregard thoughts about contamination and refrain 
from behaviors such as washing, showering, cleaning, and other decontamination 
routines when you try to do so? 
 
0 Not at all difficult 
1 A little difficult 
2 Moderately difficult 
3 Very difficult 
4 Extremely difficult 
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Category 2: Concerns about being Responsible for Harm, Injury, or Bad Luck 
Examples . . . 
-A doubt that you might have made a mistake that could cause something awful or 
harmful to happen. 
-The thought that a terrible accident, disaster, injury, or other bad luck might have 
occurred and you weren’t careful enough to prevent it. 
-The thought that you could prevent harm or bad luck by doing things in a certain 
way, counting to certain numbers, or by avoiding certain “bad” numbers or words. 
-Thought of losing something important that you are unlikely to lose (e.g., wallet, 
identify theft, papers). 
-Checking things such as locks, switches, your wallet, etc. more often than is 
necessary. 
-Repeatedly asking or checking for reassurance that something bad did not (or will 
not) happen. 
-Mentally reviewing past events to make sure you didn’t do anything wrong. 
-The need to follow a special routine because it will prevent harm or disasters from 
occurring. 
-The need to count to certain numbers, or avoid certain bad numbers, due to the fear 
of harm. 
 
The next questions ask about your experiences with thoughts and behaviors related to 
harm and disasters over the last month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be 
slightly different than the examples listed above. Please circle the number next to 
your answer: 
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1. About how much time have you spent each day thinking about the possibility of 
harm or disasters and engaging in checking or efforts to get reassurance that such 
things do not (or did not) occur? 
 
0 None at all 
1 Less than 1 hour each day 
2 Between 1 and 3 hours each day 
3 Between 3 and 8 hours each day 
4 8 hours or more each day 
2. To what extent have you avoided situations so that you did not have to check for 
danger or worry about possible harm or disasters? 
 
0 None at all 
1 A little avoidance 
2 A moderate amount of avoidance 
3 A great deal of avoidance 
4 Extreme avoidance of nearly all things 
 
3. When you think about the possibility of harm or disasters, or if you cannot check 
or get reassurance about these things, how distressed or anxious did you become? 
 
0 Not at all distressed/anxious 
1 Mildly distressed/anxious 
2 Moderately distressed/anxious 
3 Severely distressed/anxious 
4 Extremely distressed/anxious 
 
4. To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been 
disrupted by thoughts about harm or disasters and excessive checking or asking for 
reassurance? 
 
0 No disruption at all. 
1 A little disruption, but I mostly function well. 
2 Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage. 
3 My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing. 
4 My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all. 
 
5. How difficult is it for you to disregard thoughts about possible harm or disasters 
and refrain from checking or reassurance-seeking behaviors when you try to do so? 
 
0 Not at all difficult 
1 A little difficult 
2 Moderately difficult 
3 Very difficult 
4 Extremely difficult 
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Category 3: Unacceptable Thoughts 
Examples . . . 
-Unpleasant thoughts about sex, immorality, or violence that come to mind against 
your will. 
-Thoughts about doing awful, improper, or embarrassing things that you don’t really 
want to do. 
-Repeating an action or following a special routine because of a bad thought. 
-Mentally performing an action or saying prayers to get rid of an unwanted or 
unpleasant thought. 
-Avoidance of certain people, places, situations or other triggers of unwanted or 
unpleasant thoughts. 
 
The next questions ask about your experiences with unwanted thoughts that come to 
mind against your will and behaviors designed to deal with these kinds of thoughts 
over the last month.  Keep in mind that your experiences might be slightly different 
than the examples listed above. Please circle the number next to your answer: 
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1. About how much time have you spent each day with unwanted unpleasant 
thoughts and with behavioral or mental actions to deal with them? 
 
0 None at all 
1 Less than 1 hour each day 
2 Between 1 and 3 hours each day 
3 Between 3 and 8 hours each day 
4 8 hours or more each day 
 
2. To what extent have you been avoiding situations, places, objects and other 
reminders (e.g., numbers, people) that trigger unwanted or unpleasant thoughts? 
 
0 None at all 
1 A little avoidance 
2 A moderate amount of avoidance 
3 A great deal of avoidance 
4 Extreme avoidance of nearly all things 
 
3. When unwanted or unpleasant thoughts come to mind against your will how 
distressed or anxious did you become? 
 
0 Not at all distressed/anxious 
1 Mildly distressed/anxious 
2 Moderately distressed/anxious 
3 Severely distressed/anxious 
4 Extremely distressed/anxious 
 
4. To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been 
disrupted by unwanted and unpleasant thoughts and efforts to avoid or deal with such 
thoughts? 
 
0 No disruption at all. 
1 A little disruption, but I mostly function well. 
2 Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage. 
3 My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing. 
4 My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all. 
 
5. How difficult is it for you to disregard unwanted or unpleasant thoughts and 
refrain from using behavioral or mental acts to deal with them when you try to do so? 
 
0 Not at all difficult 
1 A little difficult 
2 Moderately difficult 
3 Very difficult 
4 Extremely difficult 
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Category 4: Concerns about Symmetry, Completeness, and the Need for Things 
to be “Just Right” 
Examples . . . 
-The need for symmetry, evenness, balance, or exactness. 
-Feelings that something isn’t “just right.” 
-Repeating a routine action until it feels “just right” or “balanced.” 
-Counting senseless things (e.g., ceiling tiles, words in a sentence). 
-Unnecessarily arranging things in “order.” 
-Having to say something over and over in the same way until it feels “just right.” 
 
The next questions ask about your experiences with feelings that something is not 
“just right” and behaviors designed to achieve order, symmetry, or balance over the 
last month. Keep in mind that your experiences might be slightly different than the 
examples listed above. Please circle the number next to your answer: 
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1. About how much time have you spent each day with unwanted thoughts about 
symmetry, order, or balance and with behaviors intended to achieve symmetry, order 
or balance? 
 
0 None at all 
1 Less than 1 hour each day 
2 Between 1 and 3 hours each day 
3 Between 3 and 8 hours each day 
4 8 hours or more each day 
 
2. To what extent have you been avoiding situations, places or objects associated 
with feelings that something is not symmetrical or “just right?” 
 
0 None at all 
1 A little avoidance 
2 A moderate amount of avoidance 
3 A great deal of avoidance 
4 Extreme avoidance of nearly all things 
 
3. When you have the feeling of something being “not just right,” how distressed or 
anxious did you become? 
 
0 Not at all distressed/anxious 
1 Mildly distressed/anxious 
2 Moderately distressed/anxious 
3 Severely distressed/anxious 
4 Extremely distressed/anxious 
 
4. To what extent has your daily routine (work, school, self-care, social life) been 
disrupted by the feeling of things being “not just right,” and efforts to put things in 
order or make them feel right? 
 
0 No disruption at all. 
1 A little disruption, but I mostly function well. 
2 Many things are disrupted, but I can still manage. 
3 My life is disrupted in many ways and I have trouble managing. 
4 My life is completely disrupted and I cannot function at all. 
 
5. How difficult is it for you to disregard thoughts about the lack of symmetry and 
order, and refrain from urges to arrange things in order or repeat certain behaviors 
when you try to do so? 
 
0 Not at all difficult 
1 A little difficult 
2 Moderately difficult 
3 Very difficult 
4 Extremely difficult 
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Appendix 4 (MRP) 
 
Dissociative Experiences Scale 2
nd
 Edition (Carlson & Putnam, 1993) 
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This questionnaire consists of 28 questions about experiences you have had in your 
daily life. We are interested in how often you have had these experiences. It is 
important, however, that your answers show how often these experiences happen to 
you when you are not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To answer the 
questions, please determine to what degree the experience described in the question 
applies to you, and use the slider to indicate the appropriate number to show what 
percentage of the time you have had the experience (click on each scale for the slider 
to appear). 
 
1. Some people have the experience of driving or riding in a car or bus or train and 
suddenly realising that they don’t remember what has happened during all or part of 
the trip. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they 
suddenly realize that they did not hear part or all of what was just said. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no 
idea how they got there. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
4. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that 
they don’t remember putting on. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belongings 
that they do not remember buying. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
6. Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people that they do not 
know who call them by another name or insist that they have met them before. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
7. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are standing 
next to themselves or watching themselves do something, and they actually see 
themselves as though they were looking at another person. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
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8. Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognize friends or family 
members. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
9. Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their 
lives (for example, a wedding or graduation). 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
10. Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not 
think that they have lied. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
11. Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognizing 
themselves. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
12. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that other people, objects, 
and the world around them are not real. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
13. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that their body does not 
seem to belong to them. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
14. Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so 
vividly that they feel as if they were reliving that event. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
15. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they 
remember happening really did happen or whether they just dreamed them. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
16. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but finding it 
strange and unfamiliar. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
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17. Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie they become 
so absorbed in the story that they are unaware of other events happening around 
them. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
18. Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a fantasy or 
daydream that it feels as though it were really happening to them. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
19. Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
20. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of 
nothing, and are not aware of the passage of time. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
21. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to 
themselves. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
22. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared to 
another situation that they feel almost as if they were two different people. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
23. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things 
with amazing ease and spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for 
example, sports, work, social situations, etc.). 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
24 . Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done 
something or have just thought about doing that thing (for example, not knowing 
whether they have just mailed a letter or have just thought about mailing it). 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
25. Some people sometimes find evidence that they have done things that they do not 
remember doing. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
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26. Some people sometimes find writings, drawings, or notes among their belongings 
that they must have done but cannot remember doing. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
27. Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head which tell 
them to do things or comment on things that they are doing. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
 
28. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so 
that people and objects appear far away or unclear. 
Never--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Always 
0%             100% 
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Appendix 5 (MRP) 
 
Dissociative Processes Scale (Harrison & Watson, 1992) 
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This questionnaire contains a series of statements.  Read each statement carefully, 
then mark the appropriate response in the space in front of that item.  Use the 
following scale to record your responses: 
 
 1  =  strongly disagree; the statement is definitely false 
 2  =  disagree; the statement is mostly false 
3  =  neutral or cannot decide; the statement is about equally true and   
false 
 4  =  agree; the statement is mostly true 
 5  =  strongly agree; the statement is definitely true  
 
 
1.  I like to fantasize about doing interesting and exciting things. 
 
2.  At times I have gone into a trance-like state in which I was unaware of what was 
happening around me. 
 
3.  There are certain events or blocks of time for which I have no memory. 
 
4.  I have felt as if I were in a dream, when I was actually wide awake. 
 
5.  I have such a vivid imagination that I really could "become" someone else for a 
few minutes. 
 
6.  I sometimes feel somewhat distant from my own thoughts and actions. 
 
7.  At times people have told me that I seemed to be off in a world of my own. 
 
8.  I will sometimes walk into a room, and not remember why I went in there. 
 
9.  Sometimes the things around me do not seem quite real. 
 
10.  I sometimes will be driving a car, and later realize that I don’t remember part of 
the trip. 
 
11.  I have an interesting fantasy life. 
 
12.  I sometimes “step outside” of my usual self and experience a different state of 
consciousness. 
 
13.  If I want to, I can imagine some things so vividly that they hold my attention like 
a good movie or book does. 
 
14.  Sometimes when I am looking in the mirror I feel like I am seeing someone else.        
 
15.  I daydream a lot. 
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16. When I am doing a routine task, I sometimes can wander off into my own 
thoughts and actually forget that I am doing it, only to find a few minutes later that I 
have completed it.                                                                                                                          
 
17.  At times I have felt disconnected from my body. 
 
18.  I often have been unsure if I have actually done something, or simply thought 
about doing it. 
 
19.  I often put things down without thinking, so that later on I have no idea of where 
I put them. 
 
20.  I have often been told that I did or said something that I don't remember doing or 
saying. 
 
21.  I have a very active imagination. 
 
22.  I can get so involved in a movie that I'm unaware of what is happening around 
me.  
 
23.  I sometimes find myself staring off into space without thinking about anything.           
 
24.  I have had blank spells or periods of missing time (that were not caused by 
alcohol or drugs). 
 
25.  I can get so caught up in music that I don't notice anything else. 
 
26.  I often seem to do things without really paying attention to what I am doing. 
 
27.  Sometimes I feel like I am someone else. 
 
 28.  At times I cannot remember whether or not I did something that I intended to do.      
 
29.  Sometimes I can get so absorbed in a daydream or fantasy that it seems real to 
me.    
 
30.  There have been occasions when I felt I was outside of my body. 
 
31.  I have been uncertain about whether something actually happened, or whether I              
only dreamed it. 
 
32.  Sometimes when someone is talking to me, although I can hear their voice, I find    
that I haven't really listened to what they are saying. 
 
33.  I sometimes feel as if I were more than one person. 
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Appendix 6 (MRP) 
 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale 21 (Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995) 
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Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much 
the statement applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  
Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid 
breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and 
make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of 
physical exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart 
missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
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20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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Appendix 7 (MRP) 
 
Ethics Committee Letter 
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Professor Bertram Opitz 
Chair: Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics      Faculty of Arts and Human 
Sciences            Committee University of Surrey                       
          
           
              Guildford, 
Surrey GU2 7XH UK 
          
                                                                                                                                       T: +44 (0)1483 689445 
                                                                                                                                      F: +44 (0)1483 689550 
 
              www.surrey.ac.uk  
 
Kerry Morrison 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
School of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
 
 
 
10th January 2013 
                             
Dear Kerry 
 
Reference: 834-PSY-12 
Title of Project: The Relationship between Dissociation, Susceptibility to 
Doubt and Obsessive-Compulsiveness 
 
Thank you for your submission of the above proposal. 
 
The Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee has now given a 
favourable ethical opinion. 
 
If there are any significant changes to your proposal which require further scrutiny, 
please contact the Faculty Ethics Committee before proceeding with your Project. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Professor Bertram Opitz 
Chair 
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Appendix 8 (MRP) 
 
Participant Introductory Information, Rights and Consent 
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Information for people taking part 
My name is Kerry Morrison* and I am carrying out a piece of research at the 
University of Surrey into obsessive-compulsiveness and dissociation. Thank you for 
taking an interest.   
I would first like to tell you a bit about why I am carrying out this research and what 
it involves, so that you can make an informed choice about whether to take part. If 
you have any questions about the research project, please contact myself or my 
supervisor: 
 
Kerry Morrison (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
GU2 7HX 
EMAIL: k.morrison@surrey.ac.uk 
 
Dr Laura Simonds (Supervisor) 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
GU2 7HX 
EMAIL: l.simonds@surrey.ac.uk 
 
* I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University of Surrey. My training 
involves working with people who have mental health problems, studying at the 
University and carrying out research. My background includes working in primary 
and secondary care mental health services and also in specialist schools over the last 
9 years. 
 
What is this research about? 
Lots of people have obsessions (upsetting repetitive thoughts or images) and 
compulsions 
(behaviour aimed to reduce the fear). Mostly these do not cause them any problems, 
but if 
obsessions and compulsions become more severe they can be distressing and disrupt 
everyday life. 
 
Research suggests that a mental state called dissociation might play a role in how 
obsessions are formed, and my research aims to investigate this idea further. When 
people dissociate, their mind continues to perform all of its regular tasks, such as 
noticing and remembering what you are doing, but these tasks do not all join up 
together like they usually would. This state is normally only temporary. Again, 
dissociation is a normal experience, for example when daydreaming or driving on 
‘autopilot’. Dissociation is only a problem when it becomes extreme. 
 
Once completed, my research may be able to help more treatments to be developed 
for people who are distressed by their obsessions and compulsions. 
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What will I be asked to do if I take part? 
 You will be asked to give some basic demographic information, such as your 
age and level of education.   
 You will be asked to imagine yourself in two different situations, and then 
make some decisions and judgements about them. 
 You will be asked some questions about your personal experience of 
obsessions, compulsions, dissociation and about your mood. 
It should take around 30 minutes to complete. 
 
(Please note: one of the situations you will be asked to imagine relates to a traffic 
accident. If you believe that imagining yourself in this situation could be upsetting, 
please do not take part in the study). 
 
What are the benefits of taking part and are there any risks? 
By taking part you will be helping psychologists to understand more about 
obsessions and 
compulsions. Changes to the health service and therapies are based on research, so 
whilst it is 
unlikely that you will gain any direct benefit from taking part, your contribution is 
important and may influence better treatments to be developed in the future. 
 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions about yourself, and you may find 
this makes you think about difficulties that you had not noticed before. Also, to think 
about the two situations as already mentioned, could potentially be upsetting. If you 
become upset or worried at any point, you should stop. Sources of advice can be 
found by clicking on the relevant link on each page. 
 
What will happen to the information I give? 
The information you give will be recorded and stored as part of the secure online 
questionnaire system. It will then be transferred to a database stored at the University 
of Surrey, so that I can analyse it. All data will be stored on a password protected 
computer system and will be accessed by myself and my supervisor. 
 
The demographic information that you give will help me understand the types of 
people who have taken part. However you will not be asked for any details that 
would identify who you are – e.g. your name or where you live. This means your 
answers will stay anonymous and I will not be able to find out who has taken part. 
 
When I have analysed all of the questionnaires and the task, I plan to write-up this 
research and share it with other clinicians and researchers by publishing or 
presenting the findings. I will also send a summary of the research findings to any 
participant who requests a copy (if you would like to receive a summary, please 
email me at k.morrison@surrey.ac.uk). 
 
This research study has been checked by the Faculty of Arts & Human Sciences 
Ethics 
Committee at the University of Surrey, to make sure I have properly thought through 
the study and have considered the wellbeing of those taking part. They have given 
this research a favourable ethical opinion. 
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What happens next? 
The next screen will ask you to confirm that you have read and understood your 
rights as a 
participant in this research, and that you are happy to take part. If you no longer wish 
to take part, please close the webpage. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns that you would like answered before you take 
part please contact either myself or my supervisor: 
 
 
Kerry Morrison (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
GU2 7HX 
EMAIL: k.morrison@surrey.ac.uk 
 
Dr Laura Simonds (Supervisor) 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
GU2 7HX 
EMAIL: l.simonds@surrey.ac.uk 
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Consent Form 
Please think carefully about the information you have read so far and think about 
whether you wish to take part in this research. 
 
If I agree to take part, I understand my rights are as follows: 
 My participation is entirely voluntary, I do not have to take part. 
 I have had the opportunity to contact the researcher to ask questions before 
taking part. 
 I may stop taking part at any point by closing the web browser. 
 All information will be given anonymously and will be stored in the strictest 
confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 I am aware that I cannot withdraw any information that I give as part of this 
research, as the researcher will not be able to individually identify my 
contribution. 
 I am able to receive a summary of the results by emailing the researcher. 
These will be sent once the research project is complete. However, I will not 
get individual feedback on taking part. 
 
I confirm that: 
 I have read and understood the information given to me about this research 
study, including why it is being carried out, what it will involve, benefits and 
risks, and ways that I can find out more if I have any concerns or worries. 
 I have been given the opportunity to ask the researcher questions. If I have 
asked questions they have been answered well. 
 It is okay to analyse the information that I give even if I have missed 
questions out or stopped before getting to the end of the online tasks. 
 
Do you give your consent, and therefore wish to continue? 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kerry Morrison                                                                                                            Page 90 of 179 
 
Appendix 9 (MRP) 
 
Request for Demographic Data 
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Please tell us about you….. 
 
I would like to ask some basic information about you so that I know what groups of 
people have taken part. I do not need to know any information that will mean I can 
identify who you are. 
 
You do not have to answer these questions and may leave them blank if you wish. 
 
What gender are you? 
 Female 
 Male 
 
How old are you? 
 __years old 
 
What is your highest level of educational qualification? 
 No formal qualifications 
 GCSEs/O-Levels/NVQ/Equivalent 
 A-Levels/Equivalent 
 Diploma (HND, SRN, etc.) 
 Degree (BSc, BA etc.) 
 Postgraduate degree/diploma 
 
What is your employment status? 
 Employed full time 
 Employed part time 
 Student 
 Retired 
 Unemployed 
 Other 
 
How would you describe your ethnic origin? 
 White British 
 White Irish 
 Any other White background 
 White and Black Caribbean 
 White and Black African 
 White and Asian 
 Any other Mixed background 
 Caribbean 
 African 
 Any other Black background 
 Indian 
 Pakistani 
 Bangladeshi 
 Any other Asian background 
 Chinese 
 Any other background 
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Have you ever received a diagnosis or seen a health professional due to any of the 
following 
difficulties? (Please tick all that apply) 
 Depression 
 Social Anxiety 
 Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
 Panic Disorder 
 Phobia 
 Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
 Other (please specify): 
 
How did you hear about taking part in this research study? 
 Advert on an OCD organisation website 
 Recommended by someone I know 
 Email or advert from work 
 Email or advert from a community/hobby group 
 Other (please specify) 
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Appendix 10 (MRP) 
 
Participant Debrief Information 
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You have finished! 
 
Thank you for taking part in this research study. Before you go I would like to give 
you a few extra details about the tasks you have just completed. 
 
You were asked to imagine some situations in which an event may or may not have 
happened.  Then you rated the probability of this event having occurred after being 
given new pieces of information. Research has suggested that a similar process of 
weighing up different types of information might contribute to obsessions being 
formed. Generally, people with strong obsessions and compulsions tend to be more 
distrustful of what they see and hear, and are more easily influenced by possibilities 
that they imagine. So for example: 
 
“You watch the expressions on people’s faces and see no emotion that might 
indicate an accident” is real information about what has actually been seen. 
 
“The lack of expression in people’s faces may have been shock” – is an 
explanation that someone imagines might be the case. 
 
People who rely more on their imagination also tend to doubt their situation more, 
which may result in them developing obsessions. 
 
One theory I am testing out is that people who regularly experience dissociation are 
more likely to become absorbed into their imagination, and might therefore be more 
susceptible to obsessive doubts. Some of the questions you answered were about 
dissociation in everyday life. 
 
The information that all participants give in this study will now be analysed. I hope 
to then share the results with other clinicians and researchers so that it might 
contribute to the development of treatments for OCD in the future. 
 
I am due to finish this project in the summer of 2014. If you would like me to send 
you a summary of the findings, please email me at k.morrison@surrey.ac.uk 
 
If you know of anyone who may also be interested in taking part in this research 
study, please forward them the online link from the advert. 
 
Thank you again for your time and help. 
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Appendix 11 (MRP) 
 
Participant ‘Help’ Page Information 
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Advice and support for participants 
Your well-being is of upmost importance. I am very grateful for your help with this 
study and hope that it has not caused you any distress. 
It is normal for people in the general population to experience some mild obsessions, 
compulsions, and also dissociation. Most people are not too bothered by these and do 
not need to seek help.  
However, if you experience any of the problems mentioned in the questionnaires and 
feel distressed by how they are affecting your life (and are not already receiving 
support), you can approach any of the following for information and advice: 
 Your GP (family doctor). 
 The national charity OCD-UK www.ocduk.org  
 The national charity OCD Action www.ocdaction.org.uk  
If you already have a diagnosis of OCD and feel distressed by anything that has been 
mentioned as part of this research, you can ask for support from the following: 
 Your GP (family doctor). 
 Any therapist or any other mental health professional you are working with. 
 Any family or friends who you can usually rely upon. 
 The national charity OCD-UK www.ocduk.org  
 The national charity OCD Action www.ocdaction.org.uk  
If you have any concerns about the ethics of this study or wish to complain, you may 
contact my supervisor: 
Dr Laura Simonds (Supervisor) 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
GU2 7HX 
EMAIL: l.simonds@surrey.ac.uk  
Phone: 01483 686936 
If you have exited the online study and have decided not to continue, you may wish 
to read about what the research is trying to explore before leaving the webpage (the 
same information is also available at the end of the study if you choose to continue). 
Please click here if you would like to read more. 
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Appendix 12 (MRP) 
 
Distribution of data and justification of main analytic strategies 
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Distribution of data relevant to hypothesis 1 
 
Non-significant results on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test and the histograms 
indicate that in the threat condition (scenario A), the distribution of both types of 
cumulative doubt scores were normally distributed within the low OC group.  This 
therefore supports a parametric analysis. 
 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario A 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Possibility) 
Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario A 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Reality) 
N 66 66 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 29.6667 -66.7273 
Std. 
Deviation 
45.00473 52.34752 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .149 .105 
Positive .144 .105 
Negative -.149 -.086 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.209 .854 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .107 .460 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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Non-significant results on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test and the histograms 
indicate that in the threat condition (scenario A), the distribution of both types of 
cumulative doubt scores were normally distributed within the high OC group.  This 
therefore supports a parametric analysis. 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario A 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Possibility) 
Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario A 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Reality) 
N 48 48 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 36.3542 -65.3333 
Std. 
Deviation 
51.08878 56.87213 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .136 .084 
Positive .088 .084 
Negative -.136 -.058 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .944 .580 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .334 .890 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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Non-significant results on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test and the histograms 
indicate that in the non-threat condition (scenario B), the distribution of both types of 
cumulative doubt scores were normally distributed within the low OC group.  This 
therefore supports a parametric analysis. 
 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario B 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Possibility) 
Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario B 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Reality) 
N 66 66 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 26.1061 -58.4545 
Std. 
Deviation 
26.61644 36.72902 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .137 .106 
Positive .137 .072 
Negative -.103 -.106 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.109 .863 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .171 .446 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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Non-significant results on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test and the histograms 
indicate that in the non-threat condition (scenario B), the distribution of cumulative 
doubt (reality) scores are normally distributed in the high OC group.  However, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test indicates a non-normal distribution of cumulative doubt 
(possibility) scores in the non-threat condition for the high OC group.  Although, the 
related histogram does not show a substantial skew, and parametric tests are robust 
enough to accommodate minor violations in their assumptions of normality.  
Parametric testing was therefore still considered appropriate for this hypothesis. 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario B 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Possibility) 
Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario B 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Reality) 
N 48 48 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 33.2292 -59.6250 
Std. 
Deviation 
42.75524 44.05153 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .226 .130 
Positive .226 .084 
Negative -.156 -.130 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.563 .903 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .388 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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Distribution of data relevant to hypothesis 2 
 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test and histogram suggest that the DOCS scores in the 
full sample are non-normally distributed.  Therefore a non-parametric correlation 
analysis (Spearman’s Rho) was selected for this analysis.  
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Dimensional 
Obsessive 
Compulsive 
Scale  - Total 
Score 
N 114 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 18.3246 
Std. 
Deviation 
17.12499 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .157 
Positive .157 
Negative -.142 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.674 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .007 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and histograms, the DES-II absorption 
and Imaginative involvement and DPS imagination scores form a normal distribution 
in the full sample, whilst the DES-II depersonalisation and derealisation and DPS 
detachment scores are markedly skewed and therefore non-normally distributed.  
This further supports a non-parametric analysis of hypothesis 2. 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Dissociative 
Experiences 
Scale II - 
Absorption 
and 
Imaginative 
Involvemen
t Subscale 
Dissociative 
Experiences 
Scale II - 
Depersonali
sation and 
Derealisatio
n Subscale 
Dissociative 
Processes 
Scale - 
Imagination 
Subscale 
Dissociative 
Processes 
Scale - 
Detachment 
Subscale 
N 114 114 114 114 
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 450.7018 84.0000 20.8684 11.9649 
Std. 
Deviation 
304.47828 121.90792 6.95563 6.71273 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .106 .258 .100 .205 
Positive .106 .258 .100 .205 
Negative -.081 -.245 -.068 -.187 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.129 2.755 1.069 2.190 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .156 .000 .203 .000 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
 
 
 
Kerry Morrison                                                                                                            Page 108 of 179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kerry Morrison                                                                                                            Page 109 of 179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kerry Morrison                                                                                                            Page 110 of 179 
 
Distribution of data relevant to hypothesis 3 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the histogram both suggest that cumulative doubt 
as a result of possibility-based information is normally distributed in the full sample. 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Inference 
Process Task 
- Scenario A 
- Cumulative 
Doubt 
(Possibility) 
N 114 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 32.4825 
Std. 
Deviation 
47.55700 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .142 
Positive .111 
Negative -.142 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.517 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .020 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and histograms, the DES-II absorption 
and Imaginative involvement and DPS imagination scores form a normal distribution 
in the full sample, whilst the DES-II depersonalisation and derealisation and DPS 
detachment scores are markedly skewed and therefore non-normally distributed.  
This prompts the use of non-parametric analysis of hypothesis 3. 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Dissociative 
Experiences 
Scale II - 
Absorption 
and 
Imaginative 
Involvement 
Subscale 
Dissociative 
Experiences 
Scale II - 
Depersonalis
ation and 
Derealisatio
n Subscale 
Dissociativ
e Processes 
Scale - 
Imaginatio
n Subscale 
Dissociativ
e Processes 
Scale - 
Detachment 
Subscale 
N 114 114 114 114 
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 450.7018 84.0000 20.8684 11.9649 
Std. 
Deviation 
304.47828 121.90792 6.95563 6.71273 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .106 .258 .100 .205 
Positive .106 .258 .100 .205 
Negative -.081 -.245 -.068 -.187 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.129 2.755 1.069 2.190 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .156 .000 .203 .000 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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Introduction 
Background 
Dissociation is defined as “a disruption in the usually integrated functions of 
consciousness, memory, identity, or perception.” (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
IV-TR, DSM-IV-TR, 2000, pg519).  This encompasses a range of experiences from 
daydreaming to pathological states, and is recognised as a transdiagnostic 
phenomenon.  Over the last two decades dissociation has increasingly been 
implicated in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), with those experiencing OCD 
reporting significantly higher propensity to dissociate than non-clinical controls 
(Raszka, Prasko, Koprivova, Novak and Adamcova, 2009).  However, the role of 
dissociation has yet to be located conceptually within an OCD framework, as little is 
known of why and when it occurs, or the impact it has. 
 OCD is characterised by the experience of persistent or repetitive thoughts 
which cause distress and prompt the performance of actions to avert the feared event 
or reduce anxiety (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  Currently, cognitive-behavioural theory 
stands as the foremost explanatory model of OCD.  However, an alternative 
inference-based explanation has been also been proposed (O’Connor and 
Robillard,1995). 
 The inference-based approach regards the subjective process of reasoning as 
being of key importance to the formation of obsessions.  Obsessions are therefore 
conceptualised as self-generated inferences that arise from an individual’s style of 
reasoning (Aardema, O’Connor and Emmelkamp, 2006).  This process suggests a 
dynamic interplay of reality-based information with possibility-based information 
(Aardema, O’Connor, Pélissier and Lavoie, 2009), where crucially an individual 
distrusts their senses and overinvests in imagination.  Ultimately remote possibilities 
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are seen as probable even though they are inconsistent with sense-based data 
(Aardema and Wu, 2011).  For example, “I see the cooker is switched off, but I 
believe it might somehow still be on”.  This reasoning style has been termed 
inferential confusion (IC).  Although cognitive-behavioural and inference-based 
models assume different viewpoints on the definition of obsessions, they are not 
incompatible.  Inference-based approaches concerns the genesis of obsessions, but 
conversely cognitive-behavioural theory centralises the beliefs that are held about 
them. (Wu, Aardema and O’Connor, 2009). 
 Empirical support has accumulated for IC through a number of questionnaire 
based studies, where people with OCD have consistently endorsed this reasoning 
style more than non-OCD groups (Aardema, O’Connor, Emmelkamp, Marchand and 
Todorov, 2005).  Additionally, Aardema et al.’s (2009) novel reasoning experiment, 
The Inference Process Task (IPT), established that people with OCD were more 
influenced by possibility-based information than non-clinical controls, whilst reality-
based information was less influential in creating doubt.  This implies a differential 
impact of reality and possibility-based information in the reasoning processes of 
people with and without OCD.  However, less is understood about why this 
difference exists. 
 Aardema et al. (2005) suggested an individual who is inferentially confused 
continues to perceive reality accurately, however this credible sense information 
lacks effective integration into the reasoning process, perhaps due to the extent the 
person is absorbed into imagination.  This idea of limited integration seemingly 
echoes the characteristics of dissociation.  Furthermore, factor analysis of the 
commonly used Dissociative Experiences Scale, (DES, Bernstein and Putnam, 1986) 
has derived a subset of symptoms relating to absorption and imaginative involvement 
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(Stockdale, Gridley, Balogh and Holtgraves, 2002), thus again resonating with IC.  
Indeed, Aardema and Wu (2011) found the DES Absorption subscale to form a 
significant and unique relationship with IC traits (as measured by questionnaire).  A 
further test of this relationship might therefore involve the correlation of dissociative 
tendencies with the IPT (Aardema et al., 2009), which would capture the tendency 
for IC ‘in action’. 
 Recent review indicates that dissociation is best represented under two 
distinct forms, compartmentalisation and detachment, rather than one continuous 
variable as traditionally assumed (Holmes et al., 2005).  Conceptually the role of 
dissociative absorption in IC might be understood in parallel to the experience of 
flashbacks/intrusions in post-traumatic stress disorder.  Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
proposed that sensory impressions and emotions of traumatic events are re-
experienced as if the threat were ‘here and now’, due to insufficient integration with 
autobiographical memory.  For example, a person becomes absorbed into the 
imminent sense of death, as sensory memories are re-experienced away from the 
contextual information that says a person escaped unharmed.  Mental processes are 
therefore experienced in a dissociated (compartmentalised) way.  Essentially, if a 
person becomes absorbed into an internally generated event (e.g. an imagined 
possibility that the cooker is not properly switched off) which is not integrated with 
contextual reality-based information, it might be experienced ‘as if real’.  Also, 
O’Connor and Aardema (2003) suggest imaginative possibilities gain plausibility not 
by their content, but through a subjective narrative.  Might it therefore be possible 
that dissociative absorption promotes the conditions for the creation of such 
narratives? 
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 To date, only the absorption subtype of dissociation has been explored in 
relation to IC.  However, Watson, Wu and Cutshall (2004) found the subtype of 
detachment also correlated with OCD.  On this basis it might be suggested that if a 
person detaches from reality through dissociation, they may feel less trusting of their 
sensory perceptions, thus elevating the credibility of imaginative possibility.  
O’Connor and Aardema (2003) also reasoned that the crossover between perception 
and imagination in IC was likely to involve a degree of derealisation, although this 
has not been tested empirically.   
 
Summary 
Within the inference-based approach, obsessions are regarded as doubts that arise 
from a dynamic reasoning process between reality and possibility.  IC is therefore a 
“characteristic of OCD that leads the imagination to trump the senses” (Aardema et 
al., 2005, p343).  However, a fundamental question remains unanswered:  why does 
an individual disbelieve what they perceive, and possibility take on the feeling of 
reality?  The proposed study intends to employ further replication of the IPT 
(Aardema et al., 2009) thus consolidating ‘in action’ evidence for IC.  Also, it aims 
to explore whether a tendency to dissociate plays a role in susceptibility to the impact 
of imaginative possibilities in the formation of doubt.  It is suggested that the 
findings will be of clinical relevance, as both IC and dissociation have been 
associated with the efficacy of OCD therapies (Aardema et al., 2005; Rufer et al. 
2006). 
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Research Question  
Is the tendency to dissociate related to the impact of imaginative possibility-based 
information and therefore the formation of obsessional doubts? 
 
Main Hypotheses 
(1) Individuals who are high in obsessive-compulsiveness will show significantly 
more doubt as a result of possibility-based information than people who are 
low in obsessive-compulsiveness.  This difference will only exist in a 
scenario where there is inferred risk of harm to self or others. 
 
(2) Dissociative absorption and derealisation will be positively correlated with 
obsessive-compulsiveness.   
 
(3) Dissociative absorption and derealisation will predict variance in the impact 
of possibility-based information on doubt. 
 
Method 
Participants  
A priori analysis suggests 96 participants will be required to ensure all methods of 
analysis are sufficiently powered (G*Power, Faul, Erdfelder, Lang and Buchner, 
2007). 
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Parameters:  
alpha at 0.05, 
power at 80% 
Test Effect size Participants 
ANOVA:   
repeated measures-
between factors 
f= 0.25 
(based on 
Aardema et al., 
2009, partial eta 
squared = 0.06) 
96 
Bivariate 
correlation 
Medium 84 
Multiple 
Regression 
Medium 77 
 
Obsessive-compulsiveness exists on a continuum in the general population 
(Aardema and Wu, 2011).  As the current study is interested in differences 
concerning the severity of obsessive-compulsiveness, participants will be recruited 
from the general population alongside people identifying with an OCD diagnosis, 
thus increasing variability in the sample. 
 
Recruitment is proposed from: 
 OCD-UK and OCD Action are national charities who regularly advertise 
research opportunities via their websites.  Although these organisations are 
yet to be approached, other researchers within the department have been 
authorised to advertise and have achieved good response rates. 
 Local authority offices or other large organisations who are likely to employ 
people representing a broad age and education demographic.  Again, 
negotiations to advertise through these employers (by websites/newsletters) 
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are yet to take place.  However, should it prove unfeasible to use these 
sources, participation will be requested from staff within the university. 
 A request will be placed in the debrief inviting participants to forward the 
recruitment advert to acquaintances who might be interested in participating. 
 
A formal diagnosis of OCD is not necessary, as a spectrum of clinical and non-
clinical obsessive-compulsiveness is desired.  However prior to participating 
individuals must confirm they are over 18 years of age, have understood the relevant 
information and freely consent to take part.   
 In a similar study carried out previously within the department using a charity 
and university sample, 224 participants were recruited and fully completed the study.  
Other studies have successfully recruited through large employers by placing adverts 
in staff newspapers and on notice boards (Aardema et al., 2009).  If recruitment was 
agreed with a local authority employer for instance, the participant pool would be in 
excess of 1000. 
 
Design 
The current study will employ a combination of quasi-experimental, correlational 
and regressional designs, using cross-sectional data gathered through online 
completion of the established IPT reasoning task and self-report measures.  Self-
report of the variables in question provides a valid, reliable and practical way of 
collecting information.  
 The quasi-experimental component will be of mixed-design, with a between 
subjects independent variable of ‘obsessive-compulsiveness’ (high and low), and a 
within subjects independent variable of ‘information type’ (reality- and possibility-
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based).  The dependent variable will be the ‘cumulative level of doubt’.  Correlation 
and regression methodology will also be used to investigate the relationship between 
dissociation and obsessive-compulsiveness, and the unique contribution of 
dissociation to the variance of doubt.  As has become good practice in OCD research, 
analyses will control for depression (Rachman, 2007). 
 
Measures 
 The Inference Process Task (Aardema at al., 2009, see appendix 2).  This 
task offers participants a brief description of two scenarios, one concerning an OCD 
related threat and one which is reasonably neutral.  Subsequently three couplets of  
reality- and possibility based information are presented.  After the initial scenario and 
following each piece of new information, the participant is asked to rate, on a scale 
of 10-100, the probability of an event involved in the scenario having occurred 
(seven ratings in total).  This probability rating equates to the level of doubt that the 
event has not actually happened.  The presentation of new and competing 
information represents the reasoning process of weighing up reality- and possibility-
based information.  This experimental paradigm demonstrated good convergent 
validity with the Inferential Confusion Questionnaire (Aardema, O’Connor, 
Emmelkamp, Marchand, Todorov, 2005), therefore demonstrating its ability to 
operationalize IC.  However, notably it has received no further published replications 
to date. 
 The Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS, Abramowitz et 
al., 2010, see appendix 3).  The DOCS is a 20 item self report scale of obsessive-
compulsiveness.  Overcoming limitations of previous instruments, the DOCS 
measures the severity of obsessions and compulsions in reference to four empirically 
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derived dimensions, allowing for the accommodation of a person’s idiosyncratic 
symptoms.  The dimensions include:  contamination, responsibility, unacceptable 
thoughts and symmetry.  Severity is measured in reference to a number of domains, 
including avoidance behaviour, and a total severity score can be obtained by 
calculating the total for each domain (total possible score of 80).  Convergent 
validity was established through correlational comparison with other common 
measures of obsessive-compulsiveness.  Both internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability coefficients were comparable to other established measures.  A cut-off 
score of 18 demonstrated an acceptable balance between diagnostic sensitivity and 
specificity, and will therefore be used to dichotomise the sample into a high and low 
OC group for the appropriate part of the analysis. 
 The Dissociative Experiences Scale II (DES, Carlson and Putnam, 1993, 
see appendix 4).  The DES-II is a 28 item self report scale of dissociative traits in 
daily life.  Items are intended to reflect both pathological and non-pathological forms 
of dissociation.  Individuals rate the frequency of which they experience a number of 
dissociative phenomena on a scale of 0 to 100.  Tests of reliability and validity of the 
full scale have shown favourable results.  Whilst originally developed as single 
continuous measure of dissociation, Stockdale et al. (2002) confirmed that the three 
factor structure previously established in clinical populations was equally valid in 
non-clinical populations.  These three factors have frequently been used in empirical 
studies to represent DES subscales of 1) absorption and imaginative involvement, 2) 
amnesia, 3) derealisation and depersonalisation.  It should be noted however, that 
evidence for the number of underlying factors in the DES remains mixed, and the 
scale as a whole is limited by its assessment of frequency rather than severity of 
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dissociation (Holmes et al., 2005).  However a stronger alternative measure of 
dissociation is yet to be developed. 
 The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale - 21 (DASS21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995, see appendix 5).  The DASS21 is a 21 item self-report scale which 
has been designed specifically for both clinical and research use.  It aims to represent 
the symptom subscales of depression, anxiety and stress in a dimensional way rather 
than applying arbitrary cut-off scores.  Validity and reliability have been 
demonstrated for the DASS21.  Only the depression subscale will be used in the 
current study, in order to control for the effects of low mood during analysis. 
 Other materials: 
 Recruitment advertisements, see appendix 6. 
 Participant information sheet, see appendix 7. 
 Consent form, see appendix 8. 
 Debrief information, see appendix 9. 
 Sources of help and advice sheet, see appendix 10. 
 Demographic data will also be collected (will not include identifying 
details such as name and contact details). 
 
Procedure 
1. Upon approval from the course team and ethics committee, all information, 
tasks and  questionnaires will be organised into a format suitable for online 
completion. 
2. Advertisements for participation will be placed on the websites of 
participating charities; requests will be made to other local participating 
organisations to place adverts on their intranet, notice board, newsletter or 
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email.  These advertisements will direct individuals to access the online 
materials. 
3. Once sufficient participants have completed the online task and 
questionnaires, the data will be transferred to SPSS for analysis. 
4. Following analysis the complete project will be written up.  An additional 
summary version of the results will be made available to any participant who 
indicates they wish to receive a copy. 
 
Ethical considerations 
In line with the British Psychological Society’s (2009) Code of Ethics and Conduct, 
the following issues have been considered in regard to the current study. 
 Distress:  A degree of implied threat is inherent to one of the scenarios 
presented in the IPT and might therefore provoke distress, particularly if reminiscent 
of an individual’s actual obsession or unintentionally reflecting a real-life event.  
Accordingly, written information given prior to participation will clearly explain the 
potentially triggering nature of the task.  Participants will be advised not to continue 
if they anticipate personal distress; they will be asked to indicate their informed 
consent; and their right to withdraw will be emphasised.  
 Detection of clinically significant symptoms:  The current study assumes 
obsessive-compulsiveness, dissociation and unpleasant mood states to exist in 
varying degree amongst the general population.  This means there is potential to 
detect clinically significant symptoms in people who are either unaware or not 
accessing help.  It would not be feasible (nor ethical) to give individual advice to 
such individuals, however participants will be advised of sources of help at the end 
of the task should they feel the need to access advice. 
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 Storage of data:  Data shall be stored in line with the Data Protection Act 
(1998).  All data will be anonymous as no identifying details (aside from 
demographic information) shall be collected. 
 Prior to commencement, during October/November 2012, the proposed 
procedure and its materials will be submitted to the Faculty of Arts & Human 
Sciences Ethics Committee, University of Surrey, for scrutiny and advice. 
 
R&D Considerations 
Not applicable. 
 
Proposed Data Analysis 
Data checking.  The data will be checked for accuracy and completeness 
(e.g. all probability ratings are within the defined limits, all questionnaires have been 
completed fully).  The data will also be checked for outliers and normality of 
distribution. 
Data Analysis.  Using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences, hypothesis 
1 will be tested using a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA, with post-hoc analysis to identify 
potential interactions between obsessive-compulsiveness and type of information and 
their effects on cumulative levels of doubt.  This analysis will be repeated separately 
for the harm-related and neutral conditions of the reasoning task.  A bivariate 
correlation test will be used in relation to hypothesis 2, exploring the relationship 
between dissociation and obsessive-compulsiveness.  Hypothesis 3 concerning 
variance in the impact of possibility-based information on doubt will be analysed 
using a hierarchical linear regression model, with depression entered in the first 
block of predictors and both  types of dissociation in the second block.  
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Service User and Carer Consultation / Involvement 
Ideas for the recruitment of participants were explored with service users and carers 
linked with the University, who also later  edited advertisements and participant 
information.   
 
Feasibility Issues 
Problem Potential Solution 
Unable to negotiate recruitment of a 
non-clinical sample through local 
organisations. 
Advertise through the university for staff 
to participate. 
Insufficient number of participants 
recruited. 
Advertise for further participation from 
university staff or students.  
Difficulties with use of online 
materials. 
Approach technicians in the department 
for assistance. 
 
Dissemination strategy 
The findings of the current study will be disseminated once it has passed course 
requirements.  It is the intention to submit the write-up to a relevant peer-reviewed 
journal.  A shorter summary will be distributed within the organisations which 
allowed recruitment, and to individual participants who expressed a wish to receive a 
copy of the findings. 
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Study Timeline 
Course approval of MRP proposal  Submit:     6
th
 August 2012 
Returned:  3
rd
 September 
2012 
Ethics submission  Draft submission September 
2012 – submit November 
2012. 
Data collection  Start:     January 2013 
Finish:  July 2013 
Data analysis 
 
 Start:    September 2013 
Finish:  October 2013 
Completion of drafts: 
 Introduction 
 Method 
 Result 
 Discussion 
  
 June 2013 
 September 2013 
 November 2013 
 January 2014 
Complete draft submitted to supervisor  January 2014 
Assemble MRP portfolio and make 
amendments 
 February 2014 
Submission of MRP portfolio  7
th
 April 2014 
 
Prepare for viva  April-May 2014 
Make MRP amendments following viva  June-August 2014 
Submit for publication and arrange 
appropriate storage of data. 
 August-September 2014 
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Abstract 
The aim of this review was to collate and analyse research relevant to the experience 
of dissociation alongside obsessions and compulsions, to establish whether a 
relationship between these clinical phenomena exist, and if so the nature of this 
interaction.  A systematic search of bibliographic databases was conducted, from 
which 18 articles were selected for review on account of their direct relevance to 
both subjects of dissociation, and obsessions and compulsions (OCs).  A number of 
themes emerged from these articles which were subject to critical evaluation, they 
were:  establishing evidence for a link, symptom sub-domains, perseverance as a 
trigger of dissociation, specific memory deficits and treatment implications.  Also, a 
critique of common measurement tools was made.  In general it would seem that 
dissociation can be considered as a feature of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 
and is most strongly associated with the checking symptom sub-domain.  However, a 
number of studies have suggested that the relationship between dissociation and 
checking may be mediated by other factors, such as cognitive uncertainty and 
perfectionist traits, that are common in people with OCD.  A crucial finding of this 
review provides the most compelling evidence for continued research into this area: 
the discovery that dissociation can inhibit otherwise routine treatments for OCD.  
Suggestions for replication studies and further research have been made, to advance 
our understanding of the relationship of dissociation to OCs.   
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Interest has been shown in the area of obsessions and compulsions (OCs) for over a 
century, but the potential involvement of dissociation has been questioned much 
more recently.  Pica, Beere and Maurer (1997) for instance noted the commonality of 
dissociative patients reporting obsessions, and obsessive-compulsive patients 
reporting dissociative experiences.  There has been a growing movement to 
understand and treat dissociation within other clinical disorders too, such as in post 
traumatic stress disorder, however these areas have received considerably more 
attention than OCs.  The last 25 years has seen sporadic attempts to explore the 
connection, if any, between dissociation and OCs.  However the research literature in 
this area remains limited, both in quantity and the validity of findings, and it largely 
lacks integration.  The aim of this review is to establish what is known about the role 
of dissociation in OCs, to identify any controversies or gaps in our understanding, 
and to clarify the direction that future research should take to produce a more 
coherent picture, one that will be relevant not only to our theoretical understanding, 
but also to clinical practice.  
Dissociation has been defined as “a disruption in the usually integrated 
functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception.  The disturbance may be 
sudden or gradual, transient or chronic” (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV-TR, 
DSM-IV-TR, 2000, pg 519).  Whilst dissociation has been recognised within 
diagnostic systems as an independent disorder, it should be noted that it has also been 
observed as a feature of other mental health disorders (Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger 
and Grabe, 2006), a non-pathological human experience (Watson, Wu and Cutshall, 
2004), and in some cultures a valued spiritual experience.  Holmes et al. (2005) note 
the tendency in both theory and research to conceptualise dissociation as a single 
concept, varying only quantitatively along a continuum.  However, clinical reports 
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suggest dissociative experiences differ in nature as well as in degree.  For example, 
Holmes et al. (2005) argue that the dissociation of feeling withdrawn or unreal when 
recounting a trauma, seems quite different to the sensory loss or amnesia that was 
assumed to be caused by dissociation in the context of conversion disorder.  
Consequently Holmes et al. (2005) recommend that dissociation be viewed in two 
distinct forms: compartmentalisation and detachment.  Compartmentalisation was 
said to be characterised by mental processes functioning in isolation rather than in an 
integrated manner, leading to them being compartmentalised away from conscious 
awareness.  Conversely, detachment could be viewed as a distancing between self 
and environment.  Holmes et al’s (2005) review suggests this subtyping of 
dissociation is supported by factor analysis of symptom assessment tools and 
experimental research.  Spitzer et al’s. (2006) review of the literature also endorsed 
the separation of dissociation into two discrete types, and suggested that treatment 
aims for each were also distinct.  For example, they suggested the aim of 
reintegrating mental processes when they had been compartmentalised, or to reduce 
triggers and cease episodes of detachment.  An understanding of 
compartmentalisation and detachment provides contextual information to the current 
review, however for an in depth account of the history and conceptualisation of 
dissociation, see Holmes et al. (2005).  The following review will focus exclusively 
on “what is understood about the role of dissociation in obsessions and 
compulsions?”.  
 
Search Strategy 
The body of literature citing obsessions, compulsions and dissociation was 
approached systematically through a number of database searches in December 2011, 
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searching:  PsycInfo, PsycArticles, PsycBooks, Psychology and Behavioural 
Sciences Collection, Medline and CINHAL.  By entering the specific search terms of 
(Obsess* OR Compuls*) AND Dissociat* without any restricting limiters, a total of 
399 unique references were returned.  From these initial records, articles were 
examined and selected for review if their primary focus was specifically dissociation 
or dissociative experiences (as already defined in the introduction), in Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD), 
or non-clinical obsessive-compulsiveness.  The reference lists of these articles were 
also searched for other relevant research.   Papers were not included for review if 
they mainly addressed trauma, personality disorders, eating disorders, addictions or 
psychosis.  Also, papers were not selected if they addressed forms of dissociation 
other than that defined in the introduction, for example eye-hand dissociation or 
dissociation in reference to biological processes.  Papers were also excluded if it was 
not possible to obtain a full English translation of the article.  A final selection of 18 
peer-reviewed empirical papers was made for review.   
 
The Relationship Between Dissociation and OCs 
Perhaps the first and most important question to ask of the literature is:  does 
evidence exist to suggest there is in fact any link between OCs and dissociation?  
This is a particularly pertinent question given that neither DSM-IV-TR or the ICD-10 
(World Health Organisation, 1992) employ dissociation as diagnostic criteria for 
OCD, nor is it an area commonly addressed in clinical literature.   
 One of the earliest indications that dissociation and OCs may be linked was 
noticed by Goff, Olin, Jenike, Baer and Buttolph (1992), who made the observation 
that OCs were frequently reported by individuals with depersonalisation disorder (a 
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sub disorder of dissociation according to the DSM-IV-TR).  To seek clarification 
they administered the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES, Bernstein and Putnam, 
1986) with a clinical sample diagnosed with OCD.  Through correlational tests, a 
significant positive association was found between dissociative symptoms and self-
reported symptoms of OCD measured by the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory (MOCI, Hodgson and Rachman, 1977).  This indicated that those with 
higher levels of OCs also experienced high levels of dissociation, although of course 
causality could not be inferred.  Interestingly this result could not be replicated when 
the measure of OC entered into the correlation was the Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS, Goodman et al, 1989), which is a clinician 
administered instrument rather than self-report.  Lochner et al. (2004) also could not 
replicate a positive association between general OC symptom severity and DES 
scores using the Y–BOCS.  Conversely, a significant correlation was detected by 
Prasko et al. (2010), who found a positive relationship between the Y-BOCS and 
DES scores.  To further test the relationship quasi-experimentally, Goff et al. (1992) 
went on to form high and low dissociation groups within their sample, observing the 
differences each group demonstrated.  Using a DES cut off score of 20, 20% of the 
sample were classed as high dissociators, and the bottom 20% of the sample (all 
scoring under 3 on the DES) were classed as low dissociators.  Comparison of these 
two groups revealed that the high dissociating group scored significantly higher on 
both self-report and clinician rated OCs.  The authors of the DES suggest a score of 
20 to detect individuals with severe dissociative difficulties, however other authors 
such as Lochner et al. (2004) and Raszka et al. (2009) utilized a higher score of 30.  
This might imply that had the higher threshold of 30 been used, the differences in 
OCs may have been even more significant.  D’Ambrosio and Vacca (2008) found a 
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negative correlation with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD) 
symptomology and dissociation.  Also, significantly less participants with OCPD 
were found in their high dissociator group (demarcated by DES >30).  In 
comparison, the correlational pattern between dissociation and OCPD and with OCD 
symptomology suggests that the relationship might be conceptually quite different.  
In summary, the evidence for a relationship between dissociation and OCs is mixed.  
Although, it seems likely that this variability might reflect difficulties and 
inconsistencies in the measurement of dissociation. 
 
Dissociation in OCD and Control Groups 
Raszka, Prasko, Koprivova, Novak and Adamcova (2009) compared a group of 
patients with OCD to healthy controls, and found that the OCD group showed 
significantly higher scores on the DES than the healthy controls.  Merckelbach and 
Wessel (2000) also found that OCD patients scored significantly higher on the DES 
than healthy controls.  In contrast, Prasko et al. (2010) found that healthy controls 
showed significantly higher scores on the DES than patients with OCD.  Notably, the 
control group for this study were selected from the local community and on the basis 
that they had no previous axis 1 disorder, however they showed a mean DES score of 
22.5.  Given that a score in excess of 20 might be considered to indicate severe 
dissociation (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986), one might question whether this control 
group was indeed a healthy basis for comparison.  This situation makes a good 
argument for applying stringent screening criteria to control groups, for both 
methodological and ethical reasons.  Watson et al. (2004) reported that clinical and 
non-clinical groups did not differ significantly on overall dissociation scores.  They 
attributed this finding to the balancing effect seen by the undergraduates rating 
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higher on the imagination subscale of the DES (generally considered the least 
pathological) and outpatients scoring higher on obliviousness and detachment 
subscale, implying that people with OCD may differ qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively from those without OCD.  With opposing evidence, no confirmation 
can be made that individuals with OCD experience more dissociation than healthy 
controls.  Potential reasons for this ambiguity might be that inadequate control 
groups have been employed, or that research has mainly focussed on establishing a 
quantitative difference, but instead the difference resides with the nature of 
dissociation.   
 
The Influence of Comorbidity 
Whilst recognising the presence of dissociation in OCs, some research has advised 
that it may in fact be a product of a comorbid disorder.  Goff et al. (1992) found that 
those scoring above 20 on the DES were also more likely to report depressive 
symptoms and meet diagnostic criteria for at least one personality disorder.  However 
Raszka et al. (2009) used a multiple regression analysis to discover the degree of 
variance in dissociation that might be attributable to depressive symptoms, and found 
that depressive symptoms could not independently account for elevated dissociation 
in their OCD group, but neither could the severity of OCs.  Instead, Raszka et al. 
(2009) found that general anxiety symptoms were the only independent predictor of 
dissociation, and therefore concluded that those with OCD who experienced higher 
levels of general anxiety were the subset who were most likely to experience 
dissociation.  Prasko et al’s (2010) findings seemed to partly substantiate both claims 
relating to anxiety and depression, finding positive correlations for both anxiety and 
depression with dissociation, however as no multiple regression analysis was 
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conducted no conclusions can be made about the exclusivity of any of these 
relationships.  Watson et al. (2004) measured neuroticism, generalised anxiety, social 
phobia and blood/injury phobia, finding only generalised anxiety to significantly 
correlate with dissociation.  Yet this association was not as strong as the link between 
obsessing/checking with dissociation, which existed even when controlling for 
general anxiety.  Watson et al. (2004) therefore concluded that a unique relationship 
existed between dissociation and OCs.  In Goff et al’s (1992) study, 62.5% of the 
high dissociation group independently met criteria for a dissociative disorder.  With 
regard to those who did not meet these criteria but still scored high on dissociation, it 
was proposed that certain items on the DES might mimic symptoms of OCD without 
necessarily indicating dissociation.  For example, uncertainty over one’s performance 
of actions was said to independently feature in both disorders, thus accounting for the 
high dissociators that did not show a dissociative disorder.  However, an alternative 
explanation might be that dissociation genuinely existed as an independent 
phenomenon in OCD.  Although, this account must be regarded with caution as it 
was a smaller percentage who did not experience a dissociative disorder.  Pica et al. 
(1997) stated that individuals with OCD and dissociative disorders shared the same 
trait for cognitive rigidity, involving difficulty with integrating new and old 
perceptual or cognitive experiences.  They were however reluctant to extend this 
proposition to say that this style caused either OCs or dissociative experiences, 
believing there to be a more complex process involving an environmental 
contribution.  A potentially important factor in Goff et al’s (1992) study was that the 
mean duration of illness was 18.5 years, therefore a higher rate of co-morbidity and 
complexity might reasonably be expected in this group.  Presumably they had been 
treatment resistant for this many years, and hence may not adequately represent 
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others with OCs.  These studies regarding the comorbidity of other pathology casts 
an element of doubt over whether the link with dissociation resides specifically and 
independently with OCs.  Also, questions are therefore raised about the validity of 
research that does not specifically control for co-morbid symptoms. 
 
Summary 
To summarise the studies in this area, it would seem that a relationship is likely to 
exist, but there has not been enough consistent replications to confirm a definitive 
link.  The nature of this plausible relationship is not clear.  It is a possibility that 
dissociation is directly linked to OCs, but alternatively this relationship may be a 
consequence of other disorders commonly found alongside OCD such as depression 
and anxiety.  Goff et al’s (1992) work reported that people with OCD can experience 
dissociation without it being an independent dissociative disorder, although they did 
question whether the DES items mimicked OCD without actually detecting true 
dissociation.  Some significant issues relating to the measurement of dissociation are 
apparent, however as they relate to the entire review, these will be critiqued 
separately further on.   
 
OC Symptom Sub-Domains 
As an extension to research ascertaining the presence of dissociation in OCs, further 
studies have considered the relation of dissociation to more specific subtypes of OCs.   
 
Subtypes 
Grabe et al. (1999) conducted a correlational investigation of the DES related to OC 
domains according to the Hamburg Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (HOCI, 
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Zaworka, Hand, Lunenschloss and Jauernig, 1983).  Analysis of the results revealed 
positive associations between dissociation and both the checking and 
ordering/symmetry subtypes of OCs.  Consequently, Grabe et al. (1999) subjected 
these results to further analysis by creating a ‘high dissociators’ (DES score ≥8) and 
‘low ‘dissociators’ (DES score ≤5) group.  This analysis revealed that the high 
dissociators displayed significantly more checking, ordering/symmetry, and 
obsessive thoughts subtypes than the low dissociators.  Although, notably this 
difference was obtained using a less robust way of denoting high dissociation than in 
other comparison  studies (Goff et al., 1992, Lochner et al., 2004, Raszka et al., 
2009).  This finding corroborates Goff et al’s (1992) conclusions, that high 
dissociators experience more checking symptoms.  Watson et al. (2004) conducted 
similar investigations with non-clinical participants and general psychiatric 
outpatients, using alternative measures of OCs: the Schedule of Compulsions, 
Obsessions, and Pathological Impulses (SCOPI, Watson and Wu, 2005) scale and 
also the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI, Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles and 
Amir, 1998).  They found dissociation (on both the DES and Dissociative Processes 
Scale, DPS, Harrison and Watson, 1992) to be most strongly correlated with the 
checking and obsessing symptom domains for both groups.  Rufer, Fricke, Held, 
Cremer and Hand (2006a) were also able to detect significant correlations when 
using sub-domains of OCs with an OCD sample.  They found the strongest 
correlation to be between the total DES score and the subtype of  checking.  Weaker 
correlations were found between total DES scores and symmetry/ordering and also 
with obsessive thoughts.  The detection of a relationship with symmetry/ordering 
replicated a previous finding by Grabe et al. (1999).  The relationship with obsessive 
thought echoed similar findings of Watson et al. (2004).  However during stepwise 
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multiple regression, only checking could be considered to have an independent 
positive correlation with dissociation.  Lochner et al. (2004) found that patients with 
symmetry and ordering type symptoms scored significantly higher on the DES, and 
unusually reported no relation with checking.    
 
OC Symptom Subtypes and Specific Forms of Dissociation 
Watson et al. (2004) demonstrated a strong positive correlation between the 
obsessing and checking symptom domains and two specific forms of dissociation 
measured by the DPS, obliviousness and detachment, which they interpreted to be 
the more dysfunctional forms of dissociation.  Rufer et al. (2006)  also looked 
beyond associations with general dissociation, using the subscales of the DES.  They 
found a strong positive relationship between checking and amnesic dissociation, 
which would fit with Goff et al’s (1992) discovery of a high incidence of dissociative 
amnesic disorder in his OCD sample.  This also endorses Watson et al’s (2004) 
finding, as obliviousness and amnesia may be considered to cover similar absent-
mindedness characteristics.  Two explanations for the connection were proposed by 
Rufer et al. (2006), one being a direct action of amnesic dissociation on checking and 
the other being an indirect action.  The direct action would involve dissociative 
amnesia creating less clarity and vividness of  memory for an action, and therefore a 
person would repeat an action just to ‘check’.  Alternatively the indirect action would 
be mediated by other cognitive processes specific to OCD.  For example, dissociative 
amnesia causing a less vivid image of performing an action may conflict with a 
perfectionist’s wish to remember precise details, thus prompting checking to enhance 
the memory.  Also, an inflated sense of responsibility as seen in OCD would cause 
checking if the original memory was less vivid through dissociation, and therefore 
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unreliable.  These are certainly interesting propositions worthy of future empirical 
testing, particularly due to the limitations of Rufer et al’s (2006) correlational design.   
Constans et al. (1995) also declared that to feel comfortable with their memory, 
people with OCs desired a higher level of detail.  If indeed the idea of desiring a 
‘perfect memory’ is true, it would be interesting to look at what unique criteria 
people apply to define ‘enough’ detail.  
 General and objective memory failures i.e. memory problems that are 
consistent across time and situation, are commonly reported by people with OCs but 
difficult to validate empirically (Jelinek, Moritz, Heeren and Naber, 2006).  It would 
seem memory problems induced by dissociative amnesia may offer a viable 
alternative explanation, that reconciles subjective and objective accounts of the 
problem.  It might also be questioned whether this dissociative phenomenon could be 
evidence of a compartmentalisation type dissociation (Holmes et al., 2005, Spitzer et 
al., 2006), whereby the memory is intact, but compartmentalised aside from 
conscious awareness.  Although, contrary to this Watson et al. (2004) did also find a 
correlation with detachment.   
 
Summary 
Research to date seems to demonstrate a potentially unique relationship between 
dissociation and checking.  On this basis alone it would be incorrect to recommend 
future research only focuses on this domain.  However, it is reasonable to suggest 
that researchers should be explicit about the representation of OC subtypes in their 
sample.  This would enable a consistent evidence base to be formed, highlighting 
where differential relationships might exist between dissociation and OC subtypes.  
Some slightly weaker evidence points to a relationship between dissociation and 
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symmetry/ordering, which might make sense if one considers that these compulsions 
might feature ‘checking’ for exactness.  Although, if this were the case, the overlap 
may signify a lack of discriminative ability between the OC sub-domains.  This 
relates to another cautionary point.  Leckman, Grice, Boardman and Zhang (1997) 
examined the ability to reliably categorise OC symptoms into distinct domains based 
on the Y-BOCS.  Through factor analysis they established four domains of OCs, yet 
other attempts have failed to agree on the same categories (Pino, Eisen, Mancebo, 
Greenberg, Stout and Rasmussen, 2007).  Even Watson et al. (2004) had to re-
organise the OCI symptom domains in their study as the existing categories showed 
poor discriminant validity.  Furthermore, Rufer et al. (2006) noted that all 
participants scored significantly on two or more of the symptom dimensions in the 
HOCI-S.  Two points might be concluded here, either a tighter definition needs to be 
made of each sub-domain.  Or in clinical reality there is no such thing as a pure 
subtype, which would have obvious implications for the study of which subtype is 
most associated with dissociation.   
 In light of the findings regarding OC symptom domains, it might be 
hypothesised that the earlier studies which failed to consistently show links between 
dissociation and OCs, may have employed samples with a low representation of 
people who engaged in checking or ordering/symmetry.  At best this would have 
diluted any genuine relationship, but at worst if no checkers were in the sample at all, 
might have falsely found dissociation to be unrelated to OCs.  Goff et al’s (1992) 
findings uphold this notion, as they found more checking in the high dissociation 
group.  A further useful contribution of Watson et al. (2004) and Rufer et al. (2006) 
was their exploration beyond dissociation as a single concept, as this might be too 
broad to detect differences.  For example it may be that OCs are more strongly 
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related to a specific type of dissociation, and consequently, when the overall 
dissociation score is used in analysis, the relationship between dissociation subtypes 
and OC symptoms is masked.  
 
Perseveration 
With research tending to favour the opinion that dissociation is implicated, at least in 
particular sub-domains of OCs, the question remains as to why this group of people 
are inclined to dissociate. 
 Working with non-clinical participants, van den Hout, Engelhard, de Boer, du 
Bois and Dek (2008) made the prediction that perseverative staring (prolonged visual 
attention), as seen in clients with checking type OC, would cause dissociation and 
subsequent mistrust in perceptions.  Using a unique experimental design, van den 
Hout et al. (2008) successfully evoked dissociation by asking people to stare 
perseveratively at either a light bulb or a lit gas stove for 10 minutes.  Through this 
method they were able to demonstrate that perceptual uncertainty (according to self 
report) increased from pre to post dissociation.  They also found a high correlation 
between dissociation and uncertainty, which was corroborated by the similar findings 
of Van den Hout, Englehard, Seets, Dek, Turksma and Saric (2009).  An unfortunate 
flaw of the study was the lack of a sufficient control group, as whilst attempts were 
made to create this group by asking them to switch focus (and therefore ceasing 
dissociation) prior to post tests, high dissociation and uncertainty did not differ 
significantly from the experimental group at all.  The experimenters explained this 
curiosity by stating that dissociation must have persisted beyond perseveration.  
However another explanation may be offered through the findings of van den Hout et 
al’s (2009) study, where significant dissociation could be evoked within 7.5 to 15 
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seconds of perseverative staring.  This would potentially mean that when the control 
group switched perseverative focus for the final 10 seconds, the new stimulus might 
have created a fresh episode of dissociation.  Either way the original findings, 
although promising, need to be tested against a sufficient control group to gain 
empirical support.   
 The insinuation that dissociation may cause cognitive uncertainty resonates 
with Watson et al.’s (2004) explanation of how dissociative amnesia links with 
checking behaviour, through a mismatch with the perfect standards a person 
demands of their cognitive abilities.  This idea of perfectionism fuses with van den 
Hout et al’s (2008) explanation of their findings.  They suggested that people with 
OCs often try to exert control over processes that would otherwise be automatic, 
such as perception and memory, which creates higher standards.  Perseveration may 
then be the result of trying to achieve these standards and therefore certainty, but the 
process happens to be counterproductive as dissociation is evoked.  Alternatively, 
van den Hout et al. (2008) suggested that perseveration blocked semantic activation, 
creating the sense of feeling strange and disconnected.   
 Van den Hout et al. (2008) concluded that OC-like perseverative staring 
causes a person to mistrust their perception, much like previous research 
demonstrated perseverative checking caused doubt in memory and therefore more 
checking.  This mistrust in perception was also found to be accompanied by 
dissociation, something which was not investigated in perseverative checking and 
memory studies and would therefore be an interesting line of enquiry.  Despite the 
use of non-clinical participants, van den Hout el al’s (2009) indication that 
substantial dissociation can be induced in less than 15 seconds, endorses the 
generalisation of findings to a clinical population, as in reality checking does not 
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always take as long as 10 minutes.  A significant strength of van den Hout et al’s 
(2008) study was  the use of a state measure of dissociation as opposed to a trait 
measure like the DES.  This therefore held the advantage of monitoring momentary 
dissociation rather than a general tendency.     
 
Summary 
Both studies concerning perseveration found a strong correlation between perceptual 
uncertainty and dissociation, however the reason for this relationship remains 
speculative and requires more exploration.  The results at least add support to Rufer 
et al’s (2006) observations, that the relationship between dissociation and checking is 
unlikely to be a simple one, and that other intermediary cognitive phenomena, such 
as uncertainty are likely to be involved.  Also, further evidence is contributed to the 
argument for cognitive uncertainty rather than objective memory impairments 
playing a role in checking behaviour.  Both Watson et al. (2004) and Rufer et al. 
(2006a) found a correlation, albeit weaker, between dissociation and obsessive 
thoughts.  This may indicate that an internal perseverative process is occurring 
during rumination.  It could therefore be reasonable to hypothesise that any type of 
repetitious act, internal or external, has the potential to cause an individual to 
dissociate.  Aside from this, related conceptual issues still need to be clarified, 
significantly whether situational doubt in cognitive abilities exists in people with 
OCs independently of dissociation, or only when dissociation occurs. 
 
Specific Memory Impairments 
A continuing body of research addressing possible memory deficits in OCs runs 
alongside the topic of dissociation, and it is not feasible within the scope of this 
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paper to provide a comprehensive account of such investigations.  However, 
naturally there is some overlap between the two areas of investigation with the 
aforementioned uncertainty paradigm, and also with the notion of both reality 
monitoring and inferential confusion.     
 Reality monitoring refers to the ability to recognise whether an action or 
event really took place or whether it was only imagined, essentially distinguishing 
between memories that originated in one’s external or internal world.  Merckelbach 
and Wessel (2000) stated that reality monitoring difficulties have frequently been 
linked with dissociation.  Furthermore, they noted mixed findings in the literature 
relating to reality monitoring deficits in people with compulsive checking.  
Accordingly they hypothesised that reality monitoring in OCD may only be impaired 
if dissociation occurred.  Using an experimental design they asked clinical and non-
clinical controls to recognise whether they had actually performed or only imagined 
performing certain actions earlier in the session.  Contrary to expectations, the OCD 
group did not perform worse on reality monitoring despite their high tendency 
towards dissociation, however they did express significantly less confidence in their 
memory.  In the OCD group DES scores negatively correlated with confidence, 
indicating that higher dissociation is associated with decreased confidence but not 
ability.  Using a similar methodology, but with the addition of an experimenter 
performing tasks and also being asked to imagine an experimenter performing tasks, 
Zermatten, Van der Linden, Laroi and Ceschi (2006), found variable results.  They 
found that checkers more frequently confused their own actions with the actions they 
witnessed being by the experimenter, however they made no more frequent errors 
than the non-checkers in distinguishing between their own real and imaginary 
actions.  Checkers scored significantly higher on the DES than the non-checkers.  
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The finding of no significant difference in general reality monitoring deficits matches 
the conclusion of Merckelbach and Wessel (2000).  However, they took the 
confusion between differentiating own and other actions to mean that checkers tend 
to remember events from an observer’s stance rather than their own, stating that that 
dissociation prevents memories from being integrated as one’s own real experience, 
and therefore causes uncertainty.  Interestingly, across the entire sample (checkers 
and non-checkers) a correlation was found between confusion of real and imaginary 
events with dissociation, indicating that dissociation and not checking was more 
pertinent to reality monitoring.  Caution however should be exercised when drawing 
conclusions from Zermatten et al’s (2006) study in regard to checkers.  This is 
because their sample was comprised of non-clinical undergraduates, and as such their 
checking prone group had mean OCI checking scores that were much lower than 
those expected in a clinical population.  This meant that there was only a small 
distinction between the checking prone and non-checking groups, which casts 
uncertainty upon any comparisons drawn on the basis of the two groups.   
 A notable weakness of both studies was their use of the DES, a measure of 
general dissociative traits, rather than state dissociation.  Consequently, it is difficult 
to say whether a dissociative state was immediately experienced by any of the 
participants whilst they undertook the task, and therefore implicated in the results.  
Accordingly, it may only be possible to conclude that people with OCD and 
dissociative tendencies do not tend to perform worse on reality monitoring tasks. 
 
Aardema and Wu (2011) set about to investigate a related memory paradigm, 
inferential confusion.  Inferential confusion relates to the phenomenon of becoming 
absorbed into what ‘might be’ which subsequently takes on the feeling of being real.  
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This occurs regardless of what sensory evidence dictates as reality.  With a 
commendably large sample of 377 undergraduates, multiple regression analysis 
showed inferential confusion as a powerful predictor of OCs, although most OC 
symptoms also showed a high degree of variance predicted by absorption (as 
measured by the DES subscale).  Similarly, Goff et al. (1992) and Raszka et al. 
(2009) also found a high incidence of the absorption subtype of dissociation in an 
OCD sample, although they claimed this mimicked what was considered normal 
non-pathological dissociation.  Rufer et al. (2006a) on the other hand found opposing 
evidence for dissociative amnesia being most strongly correlated with OCs.  From 
Aardema and Wu’s (2011) results, one might predict that when people become 
absorbed in imaginative possibilities (e.g. the house burning down as a result of the 
cooker not being turned off), this falsely inflates the sense of reality.  Subsequently 
more trust may be placed in this possibility than the reality (e.g. of having really 
turned the cooker off), which could prompt checking behaviour.  This argument 
holds a logical sequence, however would require further empirical investigation for it 
to be extrapolated to a clinical population.  An additional finding from Aardema and 
Wu (2011) was that depersonalisation was a negative predictor of OCs, in particular 
hoarding and checking.  Unfortunately only a minimal explanation was offered for 
this interesting finding, where they alluded to the process of detaching from reality as 
being in some way helpful. 
 
Summary 
It is possible, and indeed logical based on evidence from other research fields, that 
dissociation in people with checking OCs may cause reality monitoring difficulties 
and therefore cognitive uncertainty.  However studies have repeatedly failed to find 
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this expected outcome.  This might be interpreted in one of two ways, either there is 
genuinely no relationship of these variables, or methodological weaknesses to date 
have acted as a barrier.  A further question should also be raised as to why the 
‘imagination’ has such strength in creating alternatives that are not based on reality 
in people with OCs?  Perhaps one possibility might be based on the cognitive theory 
of OCD.  The theory states that individuals have a propensity to process information 
in a distorted way, for example overestimating threat (Clark, 2007).  Consequently a 
catastrophic representation of reality may be created. 
 
Genetic and Environmental Influences 
Trauma has repeatedly been linked with dissociation, both in respect to post-
traumatic stress disorder and the proneness to dissociation in adulthood following 
childhood trauma.  In fact Pica et al. (1997) asserted that the origins of dissociation 
mostly reside in the environment and not in biology.  On this basis, Lochner et al. 
(2004) investigated the incidence of childhood trauma in adults with OCD who 
dissociate.  Overall a positive correlation was established between DES scores and 
childhood trauma, in particular physical neglect.  The participants were divided into 
high and low dissociation groups based on a DES cut score of 30, defining 15.8% as 
high dissociators.  Interestingly, significantly more experiences of other disorders 
including bulimia and borderline personality disorder were reported in the high 
dissociator group.  This might indicate that the dissociation could not be presumed as 
a unique feature of OCD in these cases, as both bulimia and borderline personality 
disorders (D’Ambrosio and Vacca, 2008) have been linked with dissociation and 
childhood trauma.  A replication of this study, controlling for such co-morbidities 
may be helpful, and also indication on the subscale weightings for the DES, as 
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Holmes et al. (2005) might suggest that trauma tends to yield a detachment type 
dissociation.  Ethical caution should always be exercised when reporting that child 
abuse might underlie an individual’s current problems.   Goff et al. (1992) countered 
the proposed link with trauma, as in their OC sample those who reported abuse 
showed no more dissociative symptoms than those who did not.  Also, Fontenelle et 
al. (2007) reported that OCD patients reported significantly lower rates of early 
trauma than did those with social anxiety, and there was no significant difference in 
the degree of dissociative symptoms reported. 
 Lochner et al. (2007) took less of a definitive stance to Pica et al. (1997), 
proposing that a combination of environment and genetics may offer a more 
convincing aetiological explanation of dissociation.  Through genotyping procedures, 
they revealed that a combination of childhood physical neglect and specific S/S 
genotypes of the 5-HTT gene could account for at least some of the variance in 
dissociation seen in OCD.    This would make sense being that the S/S alleles had 
previously been connected with a susceptibility to anxiety.  This is a fertile area for 
research, as little other data exists to allow evaluation.  Perhaps significantly, six of 
the sample had pre-diagnosed dissociative disorders, which may have skewed results 
as other studies show that people with OCs dissociate regardless of an independent 
dissociative disorder.  Strangely only one of those with dissociative disorder scored 
over 30 which would have been considered as severe, which questions the reliability 
of the DES cut-off scores in identifying high dissociators. 
     
Interference with Therapy 
With growing evidence for the presence of dissociation alongside OCs, Rufer et al. 
(2006b) questioned the efficacy of therapeutic intervention for this group of patients, 
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particularly as they noted other research implied dissociation hindered treatment of 
panic disorder with agoraphobia.  Additionally, Rufer et al. (2006b) noted that 20-
50% of OCD patients fail to improve satisfactorily through psychological treatment.   
 After cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) intervention lasting an average of 
9.5 weeks, Rufer et al. (2006b) found that scores on the Y-BOCS post treatment 
could be adequately predicted by the DES absorption and imaginative-involvement 
subscale.  Those who had a tendency to dissociate prior to treatment saw less 
improvement in their OC symptoms.  Participants who were classed as treatment 
non-responders (did not see at least a 35% reduction in their Y-BOCS scores) were 
shown to experience significantly more dissociation pre-treatment to those who did 
show response to treatment, and again this difference was unique to the absorption 
aspect of dissociation.  These relationships all remained significant once controlling 
for co-morbidities and medication use.  
 CBT for OCD and panic disorder with agoraphobia shares a common 
treatment strategy of exposure therapy.  It was therefore believed that dissociation 
might interfere through the disruption of effective exposure, and would make sense 
given the rationale for the mechanism of the intervention.  Exposure treatment 
involves an individual becoming intentionally and fully exposed to their anxiety, 
which is usually provoked by a specific stimulus such as an obsessional fear.  The 
anxiety is then allowed to decline naturally over time, a process known as 
habituation, whereby the association between the stimulus and fear response are de-
conditioned.  Dissociation might therefore disrupt the process by preventing an 
individual from becoming fully exposed to their anxiety, which is essential to enable 
successful habituation to occur.  As with all evaluations of CBT, the ability for 
comparison with other studies can be limited as CBT is an umbrella term for a 
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number of different techniques, meaning that each participant cannot be guaranteed 
to have received equivalent intervention.  Additionally, the participants of Rufer et 
al’s (2006b) study were a mix of inpatients and outpatients, therefore inpatients 
would presumably be receiving support in addition to CBT sessions, so it cannot be 
assumed the treatment across the sample was comparable either. 
 In a related study Spitzer, Barnow, Freyberger and Grabe (2007) observed 
that non-responders to treatment began treatment with significantly higher levels of 
dissociation than treatment responders, although only a few of this sample were 
actually diagnosed with OCD.  Additionally regression analysis revealed that 
dissociation was a predictor of non-response to treatment, alongside other factors 
including low psychopathology on entering treatment and personality disorder.  The 
context of this study differed markedly from Rufer et al. (2006b), as the therapeutic 
approach was psychodynamic rather than CBT, however this orientation would also 
require a person to experience rather than disconnect from anxiety.  A problem with 
making OC specific conclusions from this study is that other anxiety conditions were 
highly represented within the sample.  Also in terms of usefulness, the 
psychodynamic approach is less likely to be implemented as a first line treatment in 
the United Kingdom, as NICE guidelines (NICE, 2005) favour CBT with exposure. 
 
Summary 
The studies of both Rufer et al. (2006b) and Spitzer et al. (2007) forecast a gloomy 
outlook on recovery for people with OCD who also experience dissociation.  They 
suggest that dissociation acts as a barrier to psychological intervention as it distances 
someone, at least in part, from connecting with their anxiety.  However, incongruent 
with this notion is Lochner et al’s (2004) findings that high and low dissociators did 
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not show significant differences in their response to CBT.  The mixed results would 
urge more exploration of treatment outcomes for this group as a high priority, as it 
might be suggested a different treatment approach should be adopted for this unique 
group.  Clinical implications might be for example, routine screening of OCD 
patients entering treatment and work targeting dissociation as an initial focus of 
therapy.  Along these lines Lochner et al. (2007), who proposed childhood trauma as 
a predictor of dissociation and therefore potentially poor treatment outcomes, 
suggested that trauma focussed psychotherapy may augment treatment response for 
later OC interventions.  Holmes et al. (2005) and Spitzer et al. (2006) would also 
advocate a different treatment approach dependent on the type of dissociation 
experienced, which as of yet has not convincingly been verified in OC.  As a final 
point, Meyerson (2011) made a fascinating proposition that a lack of treatment 
progress may be remedied by using hypnotically induced dissociation (HID).  
Meyerson (2011) suggested HID may have therapeutic qualities as it facilitates 
‘natural’ and positive dissociation to be restored; reintegrates elements that have 
been unhelpfully dissociated; and enables access to intrapsychic origins of distress 
that contribute to OCs.  However, even Meyerson (2011) admitted that HID was yet 
to become a mainstream treatment.  This alternative approach would most certainly 
need to be subjected to empirical testing to gain credibility. 
 
Measurement of Dissociation 
As a final point in reviewing literature in the area of OCs and dissociation, the 
effective measurement of these concepts will be considered.  The DES has been by 
far the most commonly used measure of dissociation, consisting of 28 self-rated 
items assessing the frequency of both normal and pathological forms of dissociation 
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in everyday life.  However, caution should be taken when interpreting its results.  For 
example, it might be tempting to attribute dissociation as a factor that drives 
checking in light of the research findings.  But as the DES measures dissociative 
traits this inference would be precarious, as no evidence has been provided that a 
state of dissociation occurred whilst checking rituals took place, an alternative 
measure of state dissociation would be needed for this.  As stated by Kruger and 
Mace (2002), dissociation tends to be a transient state and therefore its relevance to 
other phenomena needs to be measured in the moment, for example with the State 
Scale of Dissociation (Kruger and Mace, 2002).  Also, whilst the DES has been 
extensively checked for reliability and validity, anomalies have still be found 
amongst the articles in this review (scope does not allow for a full review of the 
psychometric properties of the DES here).  For example, the mean DES score for 
OCD samples has varied widely between 10.8 (Rufer et al, 2006b) and 24.5 
(Merckelbach and Wessel, 2000), making it difficult to compare or integrate 
findings.  Furthermore, in some studies the apparently elevated DES scores in OCD 
groups were actually equivalent to the scores of healthy controls in other studies.  As 
already indicated, at the very least researchers should make explicit the subtype of 
OCs represented in their sample, as this may aid more reliable interpretation.  Some 
studies have also created high and low dissociation groups based on a pre-determined 
DES cut off point, however the generalisability of these results is limited because the 
cut score varied remarkably, with some studies claiming people scoring over 8 were 
high dissociators and others, a score of over 30. 
 With regard to the measurement of OC’s, a wide variety of measurement 
tools have been employed, both self-report and clinician rated, which may impact on 
the ability to generalise findings.  Westenberg (2004) showed that client and clinician 
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ratings of symptoms varied significantly, which would imply that when assessing a 
number of people’s symptoms the most reliable method would be for a clinician to 
rate, as they would at least keep consistency across the sample.  The Y-BOCS 
appears to be the most popular tool for this, and has been considered the gold 
standard of assessment tools for OCD (Deacon and Abramowitz, 2005).  Although, it 
should also be acknowledged that it would be quite unfeasible for a clinician to rate 
symptoms in all studies. 
 
Conclusion 
This review has provided a critical account of the research literature that enlightens 
our understanding of the relationship between dissociation and OCs.  Methodological 
issues aside, I will attempt to summarise and assimilate the findings to date. 
 To warrant research interest in this area, a level of dissociation greater than 
what might be expected in the normal population needed to be identified in people 
with OCs.  Several studies were able to demonstrate this, however others were 
unable to confirm it.  These mixed findings may reflect a genuine lack of 
relationship, but it seems possible that the OC symptom distribution within some 
samples may have been such that dissociative features would not have been 
reasonably expected anyway.  On the whole, dissociation and OC symptom severity 
did not seem to show a dose-dependent relationship.  As it would seem that people 
with OCD do differ from the general population in terms of dissociation, it would be 
interesting to see whether this variance is about nature or degree?  Amid concerns 
that dissociation may be the product of co-morbidities commonly occurring 
alongside OCD, only one study found OCs to significantly predict dissociative 
symptoms yet two studies showed the potentially strong influence of generalised 
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anxiety to dissociation.  Further research into this area would be useful, to determine 
whether the link with dissociation is unique to OCs or is attributable to another 
disorder.   
 The cluster of research investigating which OC symptom subtypes are most 
associated with dissociation revealed that dissociation is most commonly found in 
people experiencing checking OCs, and to a lesser extent ordering/symmetry.  A 
question in need of further investigation here is whether higher scores on the DES 
really reflect dissociative experiences, or whether they are actually measuring an OC 
symptom?  For example, being unsure about really having performed an action could 
indicate both dissociation and checking obsessions.  Also, it would be interesting to 
find out how dissociation and checking come together, perhaps through the concept 
of perfectionism.   On account of dissociation being a transient state, the ‘in the 
moment’ experiences of people with different types of OC could be assessed too. 
 Relatively little has been found about why people with OCs dissociate, as 
overwhelmingly researchers have sought to investigate dissociative traits rather than 
the nature of transient states of dissociation.  Only one causal suggestion has been 
made, that perseverative staring may induce dissociation and subsequent uncertainty, 
however it is difficult to conceive that this might be the only trigger.  It would be 
worthwhile exploring the likelihood of alternative styles of perseveration found in 
OCs causing dissociation, for example perseverative checking when reading a 
sentence.  A theme that has arisen frequently throughout the literature is the 
possibility that dissociation and OCs might be linked through a mediating factor of 
cognitive uncertainty.  This idea suggests that people may not in fact have a poor 
memory in general, they may instead lack confidence in their memory ability.  Two 
further, but unsubstantiated suggestions were given.  Firstly, that dissociation may 
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reduce vividness of memories and therefore cause mistrust.  Alternatively, people 
with OCD often also possess traits of perfectionism, which if applied to mental 
processes may mean that they demand absolute clarity to feel comfortable.  If these 
high standards cannot be met because dissociation has reduced the quality of a 
mental representation, this may trigger uncertainty.  Two researchers have made this 
tentative link with perfectionism, which is surely an interesting attempt to connect 
with the wider OCD literature.  However another related area to think about might 
also be the general trend for intolerance of uncertainty in OCD.  Several lines of 
enquiry here would benefit from more investigation.  What is the experience of 
dissociation on the quality of memories for actions in dissociation?  Also, how much 
detail and clarity is demanded of a memory, and how might dissociation impact on 
this?  Some logical suggestions were made that dissociation may cause reality 
monitoring deficits in people with OCD, however this was not substantiated.  In 
terms of the longer term aetiology of dissociation in OC, both trauma and genetics 
have been implicated, at least in part.  
 In drawing on the wider body of research Holmes et al. (2005) made the 
argument for two distinct types of dissociation, detachment and 
compartmentalisation, each of which could account for the different types of 
dissociative experiences found across a range of mental health disorders.  Holmes et 
al. (2005) and Spitzer et al. (2006) both advocated the importance of discovering 
which specific dissociative process underlies a disorder, as this would have important 
repercussions for treatment approaches.  So far, no research has attempted to 
categorise the dissociation seen in OCs in this way, and even research seeking to find 
which subscale of the DES (which do not map directly on to the idea of detachment 
and compartmentalisation) is most involved with OCs is relatively incongruent, with 
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some suggesting absorption and others dissociative amnesia.  Pica et al. (1997) 
alluded to OCD being more akin to compartmentalisation as a person might be said 
to be guarding against an internal source of anxiety, whereas trauma based 
dissociation would guard against external threat and therefore utilize a detachment 
style dissociation.  This is certainly an interesting idea, although the suggestion that 
OCD involves only a sense of internal threat might be debated.  Furthermore, given 
the heterogeneous presentation of OCs, it might even be possible that each subtype is 
characterised by a different form of dissociation.  Although these are of course just 
speculations about the conceptual split of dissociation in OCs, but hypotheses worth 
testing nonetheless. 
 Whilst we seem far from a cohesive narrative in terms of if, when and why 
dissociation features in OCs, we do have some promising lines of enquiry to pursue.  
Perhaps the most compelling rationale for investing research into this area, is the 
evidence suggesting dissociation may prevent the successful treatment of OCs, 
through interfering with the experience of anxiety during exposure treatment 
protocols. 
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PSYCHD CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Brief Overview of Clinical Experience 
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Year One, Day Treatment Service and Community Mental Health and 
Recovery Service 
In this placement I worked with adults who brought a range of issues to therapy, 
including obsessive-compulsive difficulties, depression, paranoia, auditory 
hallucinations, panic attacks and emotional dysregulation.  I took a mainly CBT 
based approach, however also used some mindfulness and dialectical behaviour 
therapy skills training.  Furthermore, I co-facilitated a psychoeducational group 
aimed at those who had recently been diagnosed with a personality disorder.  With 
consultation from a neuropsychologist, I conducted two cognitive assessments, using 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (third edition) and Wechsler Memory Scale 
(third edition), for individuals who were reporting deteriorations in their memory.  
During this placement I conducted a small scale service related research project, 
using focus groups to better understand the factors which affected people’s 
likelihood of joining and completing a therapy group.  The results of this were 
published in the local NHS Trust’s online journal. 
 
Year 2, Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service 
Working in a child and adolescent mental health service I saw young people and 
their families who were experiencing emotional, behaviour and developmental 
problems.  I drew on a range of therapeutic approaches, including systemic, 
narrative, motivational interviewing and cognitive behavioural therapies.  Some of 
the issues that were bought to therapy were anger, post-traumatic stress, persistent 
hair pulling, difficult family relationships, anxiety and suspected Asperger’s 
Syndrome.  In the course of this placement I carried out assessments using the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (fourth edition), Wechsler Preschool and 
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Primary Scale of Intelligence (fourth edition) and Wechsler Individual Achievement 
Test (third edition).   
 
Year 2, Inpatient Service for People with Learning Disabilities 
In this inpatient service I carried out and contributed to a number of behavioural 
assessments which included observations, interviews with family and carers, a 
review of historical records and functional analyses.  Such assessments were used by 
other professionals to inform care plans.  Furthermore I wrote and delivered training 
to nursing and care staff explaining functional analysis, with the aim of improving 
the completion and quality of ward based behaviour monitoring.  I also worked with 
family and carers to formulate individual difficulties e.g. the experience of a service 
user who heard voices.  During the placement I carried out psychometric testing to 
assist in the formal diagnosis of a learning disability, and also to establish a baseline 
level of cognitive function for a gentleman with Down Syndrome who was suspected 
to be developing dementia.  Motivated by the Winterbourne View investigation,  I 
carried out some practice based research to understand the experience and 
perspectives of inpatient service users on the use of physical restraint methods. 
 
Year 3, Older Adults Mental Health Service and Memory Assessment Service 
Based in a Memory Assessment Service, I undertook two neuropsychological 
assessments of people in their eighties who were concerned about a deterioration in 
their memory and everyday functioning.  These assessments featured direct client 
and family interviews and also the following tests:  Test of Premorbid Functioning – 
UK Edition, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Fourth UK Edition, Wechsler 
Memory Scale – Fourth UK Edition, The Graded Naming Test, Delis-Kaplan 
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Executive Functioning System, Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of 
Neuropsychological Status, General Anxiety Disorder 7 and Geriatric Depression 
Scale.  Additionally within the Memory Assessment Service, I co-facilitated a 
Cognitive Stimulation Therapy Group for people who had already been given a 
diagnosis of a dementia.  In a mental health service for older adults I undertook 
therapy with an individual with agoraphobia, and also with another person who was 
struggling do adapt to a family member’s cognitive decline.  These interventions 
drew on systemic, narrative and cognitive behavioural approaches, and also involved 
an element of reflecting on the cases psychodynamically, thinking about relationship 
patterns and defences within therapy.  Another part of this placement was spent 
designing, introducing and reporting on a team formulation group with a care home 
in-reach service, drawing strongly on The Newcastle Model. 
 
Year 3, Health - Psychological Medicine Service 
This placement was based in an acute hospital and involved working with people 
who were struggling to cope with a physical illness.  I worked with individuals who 
had chronic pain, anxiety related to a heart condition, difficulty managing diabetes, 
were facing a future of physical deterioration and were adapting to having had 
cancer.  My approach to therapy with these clients was influenced by CBT, 
mindfulness and ACT.  Additionally, I undertook a neuropsychological assessment 
with a gentleman who had had a stroke, to better understand his strengths and 
difficulties when returning to work.  As part of the placement I also delivered 
training to newly qualified nurses about maintaining resilience in the NHS. 
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PSYCHD CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Tables of Academic Assignments 
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Year I Assessments 
PROGRAMME 
COMPONENT 
TITLE OF ASSIGNMENT 
Fundamentals of Theory 
and Practice in Clinical 
Psychology 
Short report of WAIS-III data and practice 
administration 
Research –SRRP Evaluating group-based treatments at The 
Community Therapy Service:  what factors do 
service users believe facilitate group membership and 
how can we better support people to attend? 
Practice case report Assessment and formulation with a young lady 
experiencing symptoms of panic within the context 
of an existing diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Problem Based Learning 
– Reflective Account 
The relationship to change. 
Research – Literature 
Review 
What is understood about the role of dissociation in 
obsessions and compulsions?  A systematic review of 
the literature. 
Adult  Case Report Cognitive-behavioural therapy with a young man 
experiencing obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Adult Case Report Cognitive-behavioural therapy and systemic thinking 
with a middle-aged lady experiencing paranoid ideas 
and low self-esteem. 
Research – Qualitative 
Research Project 
‘If you don’t stop crying, I’ll give you something to 
cry about’:  Exploring adults’ experiences of being 
smacked as children and future intent to smack. 
Research – Major 
Research Project 
Proposal 
The relationship between dissociation, susceptibility 
to doubt and obsessive-compulsiveness. 
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Year II Assessments 
PROGRAMME 
COMPONENT 
TITLE OF ASSESSMENT 
Research Research Methods and Statistics test 
Professional Issues 
Essay 
The Kings Fund published - ‘Leadership and 
engagement for improvement in the NHS:  
Together we can’ (2012).  What role can the clinical 
psychology profession make in effecting change and 
how might this contribution be received by other 
managerial professional groups? 
Problem Based 
Learning – Reflective 
Account 
A reflective account of a problem based learning 
exercise considering issues of difference and diversity 
in a child protection case.  
Child and Family Case 
Report 
Systemic and narrative work with a 14 year old boy 
referred for help with anger and behavioural problems. 
Personal and 
Professional Learning 
Discussion Groups – 
Process Account 
A process account of personal and professional 
learning and development group activity over two 
years. 
 
People with Learning 
Disabilities – Oral 
Presentation of Clinical 
Activity 
Developing skills in working psychologically  
with teams. 
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Year III Assessments 
PROGRAMME 
COMPONENT 
ASSESSMENT TITLE 
Research – MRP 
Portfolio 
The relationship between dissociation, susceptibility to 
doubt and obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Personal and 
Professional Learning – 
Final Reflective 
Account 
On becoming a clinical psychologist: a retrospective, 
developmental, reflective account of the experience of 
training 
Older People Case 
Report 
A neuropsychology assessment with a lady in her 
eighties with a suspected dementia.   
 
